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INTRODUCTION

As the United States continues to prosecute its war on terrorism
at home and abroad, questions will inevitably arise about the jurisdiction of the federal courts to consider challenges to military detention
and interrogation overseas. In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court declared that federal courts may entertain the claims of those detained
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,1 but it said little about the scope and limits
of its jurisdictional holding. Reports indicate that the United States
may be detaining and interrogating suspected members of al Qaeda at
t
Prentice H. Marshall Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. My
thanks to Andy DeVooght, Barry Friedman, Vicki Jackson, Andy Leipold, Trevor Morrison,
Gerry Neuman, and Larry Yackle for comments on an earlier version of this essay, to the
Cornell Law Review for the invitation to participate in its symposium on habeas corpus, and
to the faculty workshop at Northwestern University School of Law.
I See 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
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locations around the world, perhaps through cooperative arrangements with other governments. 2 Rasul's emphasis on the degree to
which the United States exercises broad, day-to-day control over
Guantanamo Bay and over the immediate custody of the detainees
held there, however, leaves open the possibility that federal jurisdiction may not extend to many of these U.S. detention and interroga3
tion centers elsewhere in the world.
Questions may also arise about which federal courts have proper
jurisdiction over proceedings that challenge overseas detention. In
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Court declined to reach the merits of a challenge to Mr. Padilla's detention as an enemy combatant. 4 Instead, the
Court concluded that Mr. Padilla should have sued in the South Carolina federal district court-the district court with territorial jurisdiction over the military official with immediate responsibility for Mr.
Padilla's custody at the naval brig in which he was held.5 While Padilla
2

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES' "DISAPPEARED": THE CIA's LONG-

TERM "GHOST DETAINEES" 4-6 (2004),

available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/

usa/usl004/us004.pdf (reporting on CIA interrogation facilities around the world and
noting that friendly governments, like Pakistan, may hold suspects at the CIA's behest);
Nick Childs, CIA Accused over "Ghost Detainees," BBC NEWS, Sept. 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/3643194.stm (reporting that U.S. army generals testified before a
Senate committee that the United States may have detained anywhere from a couple of
dozen to one hundred prisoners in secret locations, and noting that the United States
failed to notify the International Committee of the Red Cross of these detentions); Ian
Fisher, Rights Group Lists 26 It Says U.S. Is Holding in Secret Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005,
at A6; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "ExtraordinaryRendition"
Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (describing the U.S. government's arrest and
transportation of a Canadian citizen to a site in the Middle East where he was allegedly
tortured into confessing to terrorism-related activities, and identifying Jordan, Syria, Morrocco, and Egypt as countries to which U.S. agents have sent detainees); Dana Priest &Joe
Stephens, Secret World of US. Interrogation:Long History of Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is Coming
to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al (describing secret CIA interrogation facilities in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Qatar, and reporting that the United States has held up to 9,000
individuals overseas, mostly under military authority); Steven R. Weisman & Ian Fisher,
U.S. to Respond to Inquiries over Detentions in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at A3. See
generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2085 (2005) (discussing how
the U.S. Executive "dispersed [detainees] across the globe," id. at 2085, and asserting that
"[p]ervasive failure to comprehend potentially applicable laws enabled the Executive to
maintain [these] zones of detention," id. at 2087).
3 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (emphasizing that the United States, by virtue of its agreements with Cuba, exercises complete jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo Bay); cf
id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "Guantanamo Bay is in every practical
respect a United States territory, and it is far removed from any hostilities," and arguing
that these factors distinguish the case from the German prison facility involved in Johnson v.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
4 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
5 See id. at 445-46, 451. Since the Court's decision came down, Padilla refiled his
claim in the district court in South Carolina. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 678
(D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3275
(U.S. Oct. 25, 2005) (No. 05-533). An initial order, entitling him to release from confinement as an enemy combatant, was overturned on appeal. See Padilla,423 F.3d at 397. The
government's decision to indict Padilla on criminal charges may moot his challenge to his
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arose from detention in the United States, the requirement that
habeas petitioners name their immediate custodian 6 has long complicated the exercise of overseas jurisdiction, especially when coupled
with the statutory admonition that the federal courts may exercise
habeas power only "within their respective jurisdictions. '7 Congress
has not incorpoated Guantanamo Bay (or other military bases and
detention centers around the world) into the territory of the United
States, and has not erected any court to hear claims arising from such
detention centers. Therefore, the exercise of habeas jurisdiction to
review detention throughout the world seems vulnerable to Justice
Scalia's dissenting argument in Rasu/-namely, that such review lacks
any statutory predicate. 8
This Article examines the limits of habeas jurisdiction in a world
in which the military power of the United States has projected the
nation's influence well beyond its borders. 9 The Article makes two
fundamental claims. First, it argues that the federal courts do indeed
possess broad authority to inquire into the legality of detention (and
other military conduct) overseas, so long as the inquiry examines actions of the U.S. government. This conclusion may seem controversial
at first, but it flows from a recognition that federal law structures and
constrains virtually all of the actions of the nation's armed forces and
intelligence services, both here and abroad.' 0 The traditional role of
detention as an enemy combatant. See Neil A. Lewis, Terror Trial Hits Obstacle, Unexpectedly,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at 30.
6
See Padilla,542 U.S. at 445-46.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000). On the origins of this limitation on the district
courts' habeas power, see infra Part III.B.1.
8 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488-89, 497-500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's conclusion as to the availability of habeas to test confinement in Guantanamo Bay as
seemingly inconsistent with the jurisdictional restrictions of § 2241, and questioning how
Guantanamo Bay can be considered "part of the United States for purposes of its domestic
laws").
9 For a deft introduction to this issue from the perspective of conflicts of law, see
Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 2017 (2005).
10 Although the Constitution makes the President of the United States the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1, it authorizes Congress to make laws for the
"Government and Regulation" of the armed services, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14. Unlike
in England, where the Crown issued Articles of War to regulate those in military service,
the power to issue such rules in the United States has always been vested in Congress. See
Robert Wm.Best, Peremptory Challenges in Military CriminalJustice Practice:It Is Time to Chal
lenge Them Off 183 MIL. L. Rv. 1, 25 (2005) (noting that "[t]hroughout early English
history, kings promulgated codes of conduct upon which the British Articles of War were
eventually based"). The Continental Congress enacted Articles of War to regulate those
fighting in the Revolutionary War, and subsequent Congresses have amended and revised
the Articles over the years in the exercise of their Article I powers. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 209 (Philadelphia, H.C.
Carey & I. Lea 1825); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 47-48 (2d rev.
ed. 1920).
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the judiciary has been to confine the lawmaking and executive powers
within constitutional limits, and to enforce statutory limitations on the
scope of military justice and other executive action.11 While the judicial sphere of influence over military affairs has always been quite narrow, particularly as it relates to the exercise of military power in the
field of combat, 12 federal courts have long entertained legal challenges to the scope of military authority. 13 The narrowness of review
in the context of overseas actions properly traces less to the absence of
territorial jurisdiction than to a judicial conclusion that federal civil
law places no applicable constraints on the particular military activi14
ties in question.
In defending this broad conception of federal judicial power, this
Article first examines cases from the British Empire. These decisions
invariably assume that British law controls the exercise of British military power throughout the empire; judicial power to review military
conduct follows from the idea of military submission to civilian oversight, and such oversight travels with the armed forces.' 5 Close examination of U.S. cases involving habeas jurisdiction confirms that the
United States holds a similar conception of judicial power in relation
to military authority.16 Despite appearances to the contrary, the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Eisentragerdid not deny the jurisdiction of the federal courts to inquire into the legality of the
imprisonment of German war criminals.' 7 Most tellingly, the Court
considered the merits of petitioners' claim that the military tribunals
in question had exceeded the scope of their lawful jurisdiction. 8 Subsequent decisions confirm the Court's willingness to inquire into the
merits of overseas detention and to occasionally grant relief.' 9
11
For accounts of the role of the civilian courts in overseeing the exercise of military
authority and in preventing the application of military justice to those not properly subject
to its rigors, see FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE: THE BRITISH PRACTICE SINCE 1689 ESPECIALLY IN NORTH AMERICA 78-85 (1967); WINTHROP, supra

note 10, at 885-92.
12
The Administrative Procedure Act, for example, exempts from its coverage courts
martial, military commissions, and "military authority exercised in the field in time of war

or in occupied territory." See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 (1)(F)-(G), 701 (b) (1) (F)-(G) (2000).
13 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975). See generally Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 337 (1806) (subjecting officers of court martial that exceeded
its jurisdiction to liability in trespass). For a summary of the role of federal courts in overseeing military justice, see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 727-29, 745-47 (2004).
14 See infra Part II.B (discussing Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
15
See infra Part II.A.
16 See infra Part II.B.
17 See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 789-90.
18

19

See id.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
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After establishing the applicability of federal law, this Article considers the statutory basis for the power of federal courts to hear challenges to detention abroad. Somewhat paradoxically, it finds that
territorial limits under the relevant habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
raise genuine doubts about the federal courts' power to issue writs of
habeas corpus to challenge custody overseas. 21 Rather than ignoring
these territorial limits, the federal courts should conclude that the
habeas statute does not apply to detention outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. That conclusion, however, need not bar
judicial review, but should be seen as inviting actions for declaratory
and injunctive relief brought on the basis of the authority conferred
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.21
Section 1331's familiar grant of arising-under jurisdiction provides the courts with ample authority to hear claims relating to unlawful confinement overseas, and does so without the territorial
constraints that accompany the habeas statute. 2 2 Such a shift to nonstatutory review of overseas detention solves the territorial problem
and provides a foundation for a form of detention litigation more in
tune with current practice. The traditional function of the writ of
habeas corpus was to require the custodian to produce the petitioner's body in court for release from confinement in the event the
court ruled in the petitioner's favor. 2 3 The statutory restrictions on
habeas authority arose from congressional concerns about the possible expense and inconvenience of transporting a habeas petitioner
from one district to another to satisfy the traditional in-court production requirement. 24 To overcome that inconvenience, the modern
cases often dispense with the actual issuance of the writ and the required in-court production of the petitioner, and resolve the matter
on the basis of briefs and affidavits. 25 What the courts do in such cases
more closely resembles litigation over an application for injunctive
and declaratory relief than litigation over a traditional petition for
habeas corpus. 26 Indeed, in both Rasul and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the

See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
See infta notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
26
Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897) (asserting that "law" is not "a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms.., which may or may not coincide with [courts'] decisions," but rather a "prophec[y]
of what the courts will do in fact"); Clyde W. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 177 & n.12 (1960) (emphasizing the need for attention
to what the courts do, and not what they say).
20

21
22
23
24
25
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petitioners were not immediately released from custody despite
27
mounting successful challenges to government detention.
The suggested reliance on nonstatutory review and § 1331 to
ground applications for injunctive and declaratory relief also helps to
solve the frustrating problem of proper venue in overseas cases. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Rasul noted that the majority's decision would apparently invite forum shopping by making any one of
the ninety-four federal district courts a proper venue for habeas litigation. 28 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Padilla echoed this
concern and expressed his own preference for venue at a convenient
center of official authority in the United States. 29 Reliance on nonstatutory review solves these venue problems by triggering the application of the venue rules of § 1391(e). Under those rules, venue lies in
the district in which the government officials reside and where a substantial event giving rise to the claim occurred. 30 Such a venue rule
helps to justify the traditional preference for the litigation of overseas
cases in or around the nation's capital.
This Article has three Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
the Court's decisions in Rasul and Padillaand the two important jurisdictional puzzles they present. Part II takes up the question of overseas detention, looking in particular at the evolution of the common
law and the decisions (habeas and otherwise) applying that law to military operations overseas. Part II also examines leading cases in the
United States from the period after World War II, when issues of territorial scope first drew sustained attention. Part II shows that the
courts have consistently taken a broad view of the potential application of federal law to military action, in keeping with the notion that
the civilian courts must stand ready to hear challenges to the exercise
of military authority. Part III investigates the puzzle of the territorial
limits of the habeas statute. It concludes that these limits on federal
judicial authority do not restrict the power of federal courts under

27 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (vacating the decision below and
remanding for further proceedings, and holding that Mr. Hamdi had a right to counsel on
remand); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (reversing and remanding with directions that the district court consider the merits of petitioner's claims). Mr. Rasul remained
in custody for a time after a subsequent disposition in his favor in the district court, but he
was later released. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C.
2005). The government also released Mr. Hamdi after negotiating a surrender of his U.S.
citizenship and his return to Saudi Arabia. Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, Held 3 Years by
U.S., Saudi Goes Home, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (London), Oct. 13, 2004, at 2, available at 2004

WLNR 5298182.
28 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 426, 452-53
concurring).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000).

(2004)

(Kennedy, J.,
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§ 1331 to hear suits for injunctive and declaratory relief against responsible federal officials in the United States.
I
FRAMING THE ISSUES AFTER RASUL V. BUSH AND
RUMSFELD V. PADILLA

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government embarked on military operations overseas, both in Afghanistan and later inIraq. As with any military conflict, the United States
captured enemy soldiers-some with ties to al Qaeda-and decided to
house certain of them at Guantanamo Bay for screening, interrogation, and eventual trial as enemy combatants. 3' To defend such detention, the government argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Eisentrager articulated a general principle that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction to review the detention of aliens captured in a
shooting war overseas.3 2 Although the government's litigation strategy succeeded in the lower federal courts, which agreed with its nojurisdiction position and dismissed petitions for habeas relief,3 3 the
strategy failed at the Supreme Court.
In Rasul, the Court held that those housed at Guantanamo Bay
could invoke federal judicial power, 34 delivering what some have interpreted as a stinging rebuke to the government's legal strategy in
the war on terrorism. 35 Some hands were undoubtedly stung, but the
decision stopped short of rejecting the government's entire submission. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Stevens based his decision in large measure on the statutory rules that govern habeas
jurisdiction at the district court level. 3 6 Justice Stevens treated Eisen-

trager as if its jurisdictional ruling had been based upon an earlier de31 For an account of the capture of enemy combatants during the conflict in Afghanistan and their ultimate detention at Guantanamo Bay, see Brief for the Respondents at
3-7, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343). Of the some 10,000 individuals the government took into custody, some 650 were housed at Guantanamo Bay at the time of the Rasul
litigation. Id. at 6. Decisions to detain these individuals were said to turn on field assessments of the circumstances of capture, the threat posed by the individual, and his intelligence value. Id. at 5. The government's stated interest in the intelligence value of the
detainees raises questions under the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit both the interrogation and punishment of individuals who qualify as prisoners of war. See DerekJinks, The
Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 367, 371-72 (2004).
32 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 31, at 10.
33 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
34 See Rasul 542 U.S. at 485.
35 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Affirm Legal Rights of "Enemy Combatants": Ruling
Applies to Those Held Either in U.S. or at Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, June, 29, 2004, at Al.
36 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-79.
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cision, Ahrens v. Clark, as indeed it had been in part. 3 7 Noting that

Ahrens itself had later been overturned in Braden v. 30thJudicialCircuit
Court,3 8 Justice Stevens concluded that the statutory basis for Eisen-

trage?'s jurisdictional ruling had disappeared.3 9 He also noted that, at
common law, habeas had issued beyond territorial boundaries to facilitate an inquiry into the legality of detention. 40 Finally,Justice Stevens
emphasized the degree to which the United States exercised control
41
over Guantanamo Bay.
Justice Scalia took issue with all three points. In the main, his
opinion for three dissenting Justices focused on Eisentrager,and on
what he termed the government's reasonable reliance on that precedent as a decision foreclosing review of the claims of alien detainees
held abroad. 42 He challenged justice Stevens's handling of the Braden
decision, arguing that it had little real impact on the continuing vitality of Eisentrager.43 In addition, he argued that habeas at common law
issued abroad only for the benefit of citizens and subjects, and did not
extend to aliens. 44 Justice Scalia argued that the common law history
supported his vision of habeas as a tool for the review of the detention
of U.S. citizens held by the federal government. 45 Finally, Justice
Scalia depicted Guantanamo Bay as lying outside the sovereign territorial boundaries of the United States and treated that factor as decisive
46
for habeas purposes.
Rasul thus resolves only a relatively narrow question of judicial
jurisdiction, leaving open both the many merits questions that will
arise upon remand and the jurisdictional issues that may arise from
detention elsewhere in the world. The government had sought a
broad jurisdictional ruling, freeing it from any obligation to defend
47
the legality of the detentions at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere.
Having failed to secure such a ruling, the government must now fight
the particular constitutional issues on their own terms. Litigation on
remand has focused on the issues that lurked beneath the government's jurisdictional submission: the various limits on the judicial en37 See id. at 476-77. In Ahrens v. Clark, the Court ruled that the habeas statute required detainees in the United States to file their petitions in the district court with territorial jurisdiction over their immediate custodian. 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948).
'8
See 410 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1973) (casting doubt on broad reading of Ahrens and
permitting petitioner to pursue habeas relief outside of his district of incarceration).
39
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79.
40 Id. at 480-84.
41
Id. at 476, 480; cf id. at 478-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the degree
of U.S. control over Guantanamo Bay).
42
See id. at 488-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43
Id.
44
See id. at 496-98, 502-05.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 503.
47 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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forcement of the Geneva Convention, the possibly limited
extraterritorial application of Fifth Amendment due process protections, and the arguably inapplicable Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.

48

One can also predict that the Padilladecision may further complicate jurisdictional matters. Attorneys in New York filed the petition
on Mr. Padilla's behalf after he was transferred to a brig in South Carolina for detention as an alleged enemy combatant. 49 The claims proceeded to judgment in the Southern District of New York and then to
review before the Second Circuit, which invalidated the government's
detention of Mr. Padilla. 50 The Supreme Court granted review to consider the legality of the enemy combatant designation, but ultimately
dismissed on the ground that Mr. Padilla's lawyers filed the petition in
the wrong court. 5 1 As the Court noted, habeas law ordinarily requires
the petition to name the immediate custodian.5 2 Mr. Padilla's attorneys had named Mr. Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, and had
based jurisdiction on the district court's ability to assert long-arm jurisdiction over him in New York. 53 Although it acknowledged that some
exceptions had developed in the past, the Padilla Court reinvigorated
the immediate-custodian requirement and the rule that district courts
may entertain habeas applications only on behalf of those confined
54
within their own territorial jurisdictions.
By restating the traditional immediate-custodian and district-ofconfinement requirements, the Court inevitably raised doubts about
55
the jurisdiction it had been at pains to confirm in Rasul v. Bush.
Habeas challenges to overseas confinement have typically named high
government officials working in and around the nation's capital. 56 In
many of these cases, as in Rasul itself, the petitioner filed in the Dis48
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding the President's order to try an alleged al Qaeda supporter before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay, and rejecting claims that the Geneva Convention created a judicially
enforceable barrier to such tribunals). Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (concluding that due process protections extended to those
held at Guantanamo Bay, and that the government's new tribunal for the review of enemy
combatant designations did not satisfy due process), with Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d
311 (D.D.C. 2005) (accepting the government's submission that aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay lack judicially enforceable rights).
49
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 432 (2004).
50
See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426.
51
See Padilla,542 U.S. at 451.
52
Id. at 434, 442.
53
See id. at 432-33.
54
Id. at 440-48.
55
See 542 U.S. 466, 475-84 (2004). Notably, the author of the Rasul majority opinion,
Justice Stevens, dissented in Padillaand argued against the immediate custodian and territorial restrictions. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 458-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (Secretary of the
Air Force); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (Secretary of Defense).
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trict of Columbia-the district with territorial jurisdiction over the respondent's place of employment. 57 In reviewing these dispositions,
the Court has simply assumed without deciding that the lower federal
courts were empowered to hear the petitions, even though this approach would seemingly violate the immediate-custodian requirement. Thus, the puzzle remains after Padilla: The majority treated its
opinion as applying only to physical custody' in the United States and
explicitly assumed the existence of an exception for challenges to
overseas detention, 5 8 but it has so far failed to identify the statutory
basis of this exception. 5 9
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Padilla also mentions
the overseas problem. The concurrence expresses agreement with
the application of the immediate-custodian and district-of-confinement rules to a domestic case like Padilla,but views these rules as operating more as limits on venue or personal jurisdiction than as rules
of subject matter jurisdiction. 60 Although Justice Kennedy described
Rasul as an example of the overseas exception, 61 he did not embrace
Justice Scalia's suggestion (in his Rasul dissent 62 ) that the overseas exception potentially opened all ninety-four district courts to overseas
petitioners. Instead, the concurrence seeks to restrict the exception
to the district court with "the most immediate connection to the
named custodian. ' 63 While this language expresses Justice Kennedy's
own venue preference, it fails to identify a statutory basis for the overseas exception itself or for limiting that exception to districts of "immediate connection" to the noncustodial respondent.
Rasul and Padillathus leave the lower courts with a host of unanswered questions about the scope of habeas jurisdiction and venue.
Uncertainty lingers about the territorial limits of habeas power, as well
as about which district court, if any, may hear challenges to overseas
detention. The next two Parts of this Article attempt to provide answers to these questions.

57
See, e.g., Toth, 350 U.S. at 13 n.3; Burns, 346 U.S. at 138-39. Of course, to the extent
the petition names a Pentagon official, venue might be appropriate instead in the Eastern
District of Virginia.
58
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 436 n.9, 447 n.16.
59
See id. at 428 (concluding that a habeas petitioner seeking to challenge "present
physical custody within the United States" should name his immediate custodian as the
respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement).
60
See id. at 451-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61
See id. at 452-53.
62
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
63
See id.; Padilla, 542 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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II
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW MILITARY DETENTION OVERSEAS

Justice Scalia starkly posed the territorial-power question in his
dissenting opinion in Rasul. In agreement with the government's
brief, Justice Scalia contended that the federal courts lack power to
hear habeas corpus claims on behalf of aliens imprisoned in foreign
territory. 64 This Part analyzes the no-jurisdiction claim by examining
the common law tradition ofjudicial oversight of military affairs that
the British colonists in North America inherited from England.
A.

The Common Law Tradition of Judicial Oversight in the
British Empire

Our assessment of judicial oversight begins by separating the
ideas of legislative and judicial jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction, or
what the international lawyers call 'jurisdiction to prescribe," speaks
to the power of a nation to regulate a particular event through the
application of its own laws. 6 5 Judicial jurisdiction, by contrast, speaks

to the power of the court to render a judgment that is binding on the
defendant. 66 Both doctrines arose during times of rigid territorialism;
64

See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 505-06 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
Questions concerning legislative jurisdiction, or jurisdiction to prescribe, typically
arise from the proposed application of constitutional or other U.S. law to events overseas.
See, e.g.,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Langraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251
(1994); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). The Third Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law (Third Restatement) identifies a variety of conduct that will support
the exercise of legislative jurisdiction, including conduct that occurs within the nation's
territory, conduct that causes effects in the United States, conduct that affects the status of
persons or interests in the United States, and the activities of U.S. nationals outside as well
as inside U.S. territory. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402
(1987). In cases in which more than one state may claim an interest that will support an
assertion of legislative jurisdiction, the Third Restatement suggests a balancing approach. See
id. § 403. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 9, at 2030-41 (providing an overview of the
evolution of the law governing the extraterritorial application of U.S. law).
66
Modern decisions treat the due process clause as a restriction on the power of U.S.
courts to entertain claims (and render enforceable judgments) against nonresident defendants. In a departure from the territorialism of earlier decisions, the Court now permits a state court to bind the defendant so long as the defendant had certain minimum
contacts with the forum, such that the exercise ofjurisdiction "does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN,
65

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS

§ 2-3(1) (a) (3d ed. 1998) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash-

ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The minimum-contacts standard has enabled state
courts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who might otherwise
lack close affiliation with the state. See id. § 4-1 (3). Federal courts for the most part borrow
these state long-arm statutes, and the constitutional limits on their scope, in assessing their
own power to entertain claims against defendants from outside the forum state. See id. § 52(4) (a). Under such a regime, most federal courts around the country could entertain
claims against high government officials in Washington, D.C. on the theory that government policy emanating from the nation's capital produced consequences in the district
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a nation's jurisdiction to prescribe applied most obviously to events
that occurred within its own territorial boundaries, just as its jurisdiction to adjudicate depended on its power over persons and property
within its borders. 67 As territorial restrictions relaxed during the last
century, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate have
expanded to encompass certain kinds of extraterritorial events, in68
cluding those that produce effects within the nation.
Yet even during times of strict territorialism, it was understood
that a nation's laws follow a nation's soldiers into battle. 69 In other
words, the national authorities clearly had jurisdiction to prescribe, or
to provide rules for the government and regulation of the armed
forces operating abroad. In England, this tradition of carrying law
into battle began quite early. According to Blackstone's Commentaries
and other authorities, the Court of the Constable and Marshal arose
in the fourteenth century to provide rules for the enforcement of discipline among the Crown's soldiers (or knights), and its authority explicitly extended to those involved in foreign wars, such as the
Crusades. 70 This court, also known as the court of chivalry, had both
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to
71
the military overseas.
During the seventeenth century, with the passing of the court of
chivalry, England turned to courts martial to mete out punishment to
those involved in military service, conferring jurisdiction both to prescribe and to adjudicate. 72 For controlling law, the courts martial
looked to the Articles of War, which the Crown promulgated to regulate the conduct of those engaged in military service at home and
abroad. 73 Parliament adopted a series of Mutiny Acts that gave courts
that would satisfy the minimum-contacts test. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695,
710 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding the power of the federal court in New York to exercise longarm, in personam jurisdiction over Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on the theory that
Rumsfeld's decision to classify Padilla as an illegal combatant led to a change in Padilla's
status in New York), rev'd on other grounds, 542 U.S. 426. In addition to the Padillacase in
New York, California federal courts asserted in personamjurisdiction over the government
officials working in the District of Columbia who were allegedly responsible for the conditions of detention at Guantanamo Bay. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th
Cir. 2003) (upholding power of district court in California to exercise jurisdiction over
Secretary Rumsfeld), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004), remanded to 374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir.
2004) (concluding that the Padilla Court's district-of-confinement rule foreclosed the assertion of jurisdiction over Secretary Rumsfeld in California, and ordering the transfer of
the action to the District of Columbia).
67
68
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See
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See

DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICr OF LAws

4

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*263.
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See MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, supra note 71, at 6-7.
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martial authority to adjudicate and punish those in active service. 74
Jurisdiction to adjudicate overseas derived from the nature of the tribunal; courts martial were not courts of record, and had no clerk,
seal, or permanent location. 75 Rather, they were convened on the order of the commanding officer, and served as temporary tribunals to
consider charges of wrongdoing and recommend proper punishments.7 6 The military itself carried out the tribunals' sentences follow77
ing their adoption by the commanding officer.
Although recognized as lawful tribunals within their proper
sphere, courts martial were subject to the oversight and control of the
superior courts at Westminster to keep them within the bounds of
their jurisdiction.7 8 Military courts, at least in the early years, lacked
power to entertain civil actions against soldiers; actions in trespass or
debt against such members of the military were the proper subject of
the courts of regular civil jurisdiction. Courts martial also lacked
power to proceed against those who were not properly subject to military discipline; civilians not duly enrolled in the military could challenge military detention or punishment on the ground that the courts
martial had no authority over them. 79 As a consequence, the common and statutory law of England specified the boundaries of military
authority, even when the events in question happened to take place
overseas.
74 Application of martial law during times of peace and to those not formally subject
to military discipline was seen as a violation of the English Constitution, and was made a
grievance in the Petition of Right. See CHARLES M. CLODE, THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE
UNDER MILITARY AND MARTIAL LAW, AS APPLICABLE TO THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINES, AND AUXIL-

IARY FORCES 4-6 (2d rev. ed., London, John Murray 1874). Throughout the civil disorders

of the seventeenth century, the royal and parliamentarian sides issued Articles of War to
regulate their armies. Id. at 6-19. Following the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution,
Parliament established a legal footing for military discipline with the adoption of the Mutiny Act of 1689. Id. at 20-21. See also I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 70, at 577 (describing the
Mutiny Act as legalizing both military law and the courts martial that administered it);
Frederick Bernays Wiener, American Military Law in Light of the First Mutiny Act's Ticentennial, 126 MIL. L. REV. 1, 87 (1989) (same).
75
For descriptions of the practice and procedure of courts martial, see MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAw, supra note 71, at 35-54. For an account of Britain's use of courts martial in
British North America during the Seven Years' War, see WIENER, supra note 11, at 32-63.
By the nineteenth century, the laws of the United States provided that military personnel
"shall, at all times and in all places, be governed by the articles of war." WINTHROP, supra
note 10, at 83. Today, the Uniform Code of Military Justice expressly provides for the
punishment of violations of military law by service members overseas. See 10 U.S.C. § 805
(2000); see also Clarke v. Morey, 10Johns. 69 (N.Y. 1813) (refusing to treat plaintiffs status
as a British subject as a bar to suit in American courts, despite the pendency of the War of
1812 with Great Britain).
76
See MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw, supra note 71, at 35-54.
77
See id.
78
See id. at 120-29.
79
See WIENER, supra note 11, at 19-31.
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Although the court martial was available to mete out military justice anywhere in the world, 80 the civilian courts were far less readily
accessible to review claims of illegality and to pass upon matters alleged to fall outside the sphere of military control. Throughout the
eighteenth century, the slow pace of travel surely prevented ready access to the courts at Westminster and gave the British military the final
say on many questions of detention and punishment overseas.8 1 But
in the few cases that came before them, civilian courts measured the
legality of military and imperial action overseas by reference to the
laws of Britain. One can see this presumptive reliance on British law
in a series of tort claims brought in the superior courts of Westminster
to challenge the legality of detention and other military action
overseas.
The overseas tort cases established three important principles.
First, and somewhat remarkably, the superior courts had little doubt
that they enjoyed legislative jurisdiction to apply English common law
to disputes overseas. In the leading case, Mostyn v. Fabrigas,the Court
of King's Bench affirmed a judgment in favor of a native Minorcan
whom the military governor of Minorca had illegally detained and
banished from the island.8 2 In this, and other cases arising in the military enclave of Gibraltar, the superior courts at Westminster applied
British law to determine the legality of the actions of military governors overseas. 8 3 This presumptive application of British law followed
80 Exercise of jurisdiction over military personnel overseas seemingly comports with
modern notions of the scope of jurisdiction to prescribe. See Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 437 n.2 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922). While the
application of U.S. military law to service members overseas presents few conceptual difficulties, the debate continues over the extent to which military law may apply to civilians
serving alongside the military. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); cf Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000) (making it a crime for civilians
accompanying military forces overseas to violate military law and providing for their prosecution before federal courts, rather than courts martial). For a summary of developments
since Reid, see Susan S. Gibson, Lack ofExtraterritorialJurisdiction
over Civilians:A New Look at
an Old Problem, 148 MIL. L. REv. 114 (1995).
81
In one case, British naval officers destroyed houses located on the coast of Nova
Scotia belonging to "sutiers"-individuals who had supplied British sailors with liquor. A
naval officer, one Captain Gambier, brought one of the offended sutfers back to England
on board his ship. After consulting with friends, the sutler sued Gambier for damages and
won. In recounting the tale in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,Lord Mansfield wryly notes that the sutler
would likely never have reached England to bring the action had the officer not been so
"inattentive" as to have brought him aboard ship. (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1032 (K-B.).
82
Id. at 1021. For accounts of the Mostyn litigation, see WINTHROP, supra note 10, at
885 n.39. Similarly, in Cooke v. Maxwell, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 614 (KB.), an American
plaintiff successfully sought damages after the British governor of Sierra Leone ordered
the destruction of his factory in Congo. For an account, see WINTHROP, supra note 10, at
886 n.40.
83
See, e.g., Glynn v. Houston, (1841) 2 Eng. Rep. 337 (L.R.C.P.). Frederick Wiener
discusses the case of Comyn v. Sabine, in which the Court of King's Bench awarded a civilian
damages of £700 to compensate for losses suffered in an illegal flogging imposed by the
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from the fact that the military governors in question (like British
soldiers and naval officers) traced their authority to the Crown, and
were therefore required to answer to the Crown's judges for the lawful
exercise of their authority.8 4 Thus, while disputes between private
parties overseas might lie beyond the power of the courts at Westminster, an action for trespass that put the governor's authority into issue
85
would "most emphatically lie against the governor."
Second, while the overseas decisions recognized the possible relevance of local law and local courts, they created a fairly robust presumption in favor of the application of British law by British courts.
As Lord Mansfield explained, parties could challenge the jurisdiction
of the King's Bench only by showing that another court would have
jurisdiction over the claim. 8 6 If, as in Mostyn, such an alternative forum did not exist, adjudication by the superior courts at Westminster
was seen as essential to prevent a failure ofjustice. 8 7 As for applicable
law, the decisions acknowledged that local law might provide officials
with a defense to liability, but they placed the burden of proving the
content of such exculpatory local law on the defendant official. 8 In
Mostyn, the governor argued that he enjoyed despotic power within
the district where he acted, partly due to the fact that Spanish law
extended such authority to the island's governors before the British
took control. 89 Lord Mansfield found that the governor had failed to
prove the content of this competing body of Spanish law, 9°1 clearing
the way for the court's application of British law as the basis for rejecting the governor's claim of authority to imprison by fiat.9 ' This
presumptive application of British law by British courts flatly rejects
the notion that the exercise of military authority creates a lawless
enclave.92
order of the military governor of Gibraltar. See WIENER, supra note 11, at 16 & n.55. Wiener describes Comyn, also known as Conning and Conner, as a carpenter who was not
subject to military discipline; counsel for the governor apparently conceded liability. See id.
84
As Lord Mansfield noted in Mostyn, the governor's authority rested on the Crown's
issuance to him of letters patent defining his responsibilities. 98 Eng. Rep. at 1023. Although Mansfield acknowledged that the Minorcan governor enjoyed power like that of a
viceroy, still Mansfield insisted that the nature and extent of the governor's power was
subject to review in the King's courts. See id. at 1027.
85
See id. at 1028.
86 See id.
87
Id.
88 See id. at 1029.
89
See id. at 1028.
90
See id.
91
Id. at 1029.
92 Mansfield's approach in deferring to local authority but rejecting lawless enclaves
makes good sense when examined from the perspective of legislative jurisdiction, orjurisdiction to prescribe. Where the Crown colony or dominion enjoyed local institutions and
ajudicial system, the English courts at Westminster would usually defer to local tribunals as
courts of first instance. Parties dissatisfied with local justice could appeal to the Privy
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Third, and in keeping with their rejection of lawless enclaves, the
superior courts extended British law to all claimants who suffered unlawful detention or other invasions of their liberty or property. As
Lord Mansfield explained in Mostyn, the King's courts were available
to all suitors and not just to British subjects born "within the sound of
Bow Bell." 9 3 Other cases extended the benefit of access to British
courts to subjects of Great Britain as well as to aliens. 9 4 Certainly his
status as an American citizen did not bar a fellow named Cooke from
claiming damages from the British officials responsible for the destruction of his factory in Congo. 95 Thus, while common law courts
would refuse to hear the claims of alien enemies during times of war,
this disability did not apply to aliens as a general matter and did not
prevent them from bringing suit in British courts. 9 6
Similar principles of legislative jurisdiction governed applications
97
for habeas corpus, as the well-known case of Rex v. Cowle illustrates.
Although the writ of habeas corpus would not as a general matter run
from Westminster into Scotland, where independent superior courts
existed, 98 the enclave of Berwick was not subject to Scottish jurisdiction and had no court with authority to issue the writ. 99 For Lord
Mansfield, the absence of an alternative court provided decisive support for the exercise of habeas jurisdiction. As he explained, the
Council, where local legal principles controlled except to the extent they were repugnant
to English law. See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION 2-3, 73 (2004).

The Privy Council thus operated as an institution that could mediate between conflicting
bodies of local and English common law. See KENNETH ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH

AND COLONIAL LAw 433-37 (1996). When, by contrast, the territory lacked institutions for
local self-governance and a local judiciary, there was no mechanism for an appeal to Privy
Council and no barrier to first-instance relief in the superior courts at Westminster. See id.
Both on the island of Minorca, where the British ruled under the Treaty of Utrecht, and
within the military fortress of Gibraltar, which the British had captured from the Spanish
in 1704, Mansfield understood the absence of local legal institutions not as creating a lawless enclave but as eliminating any possible conflict and clearing the way for the application of English law. See supra note 84. For accounts of British control over Gibraltar, see
ROBERTS-WRAY, supra, at 681-82.
93 98 Eng. Rep. at 1027. The plaintiff had been born in a conquered country, but
nonetheless owed allegiance to the Crown and thus qualified as a subject. See 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370. Great Britain later developed the idea of a British "protected person" to capture the notion that the degree of allegiance and protection owed to
and from an individual born within a protectorate might differ from that of a subject. See
ROBERTS-WRAY, supra note 92, at 561-63.
94 See Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1025 (argument of counsel) (citing a case in which a
plaintiff described as an "alien infidel" was permitted to sue representatives of the former
governor of Patna for money due under an employment contract).
95 Cooke v. Maxwell, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 614 (K.B.).
96 See Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1027-28, 1032.
97
(1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B.).
98 Following the union of Scotland and England in 1707, Scotland remained relatively
independent from England and retained its own court system. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *95-99.

99

See Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. at 598.
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King's Bench could issue the writ to any place "under the subjection
of the Crown of England."""' For Mansfield, that broad conception of
habeas authority included territories beyond the realm, including the
Isle of Man, the colonies in America and the West Indies, and the
Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey. 1 1 Although questions might
arise concerning the ability of the court to enforce its decrees and
provide effective relief, Mansfield concluded that habeas would often
10 2
provide the "most effectual remedy" for unlawful detention.
Dating from the middle and late eighteenth century, these cases
help to explain later decisions in which the superior courts at Westminster issued the writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of detention overseas. 10 3 Perhaps the most famous of these cases, Ex parte
Anderson,10 4 arose on the eve of the American Civil War and involved
the issuance of the writ from Westminster to prevent Canadian officials from extraditing a runaway slave to the slave-holding state of Missouri, from which he had escaped. 10 5 The case began when the
United States invoked its extradition treaty with Great Britain, seeking
the return of Anderson to face the state criminal charge that he had
murdered a white man during his escape from slavery in Missouri.
Canadian officials imprisoned Anderson pending resolution of the extradition issue by the courts. While judicial process ground along in
Canada, abolitionists in England approached the superior courts in
London for a writ of habeas corpus. Remarkably, the Queen's Bench
agreed to issue the writ and directed an officer in Canada to serve the
writ on Anderson's custodian after concluding that the treaty did not
authorize extradition on the facts of the case.
In the course of its opinion, the Queen's Bench rejected two
weighty arguments against the assertion of habeas jurisdiction. The
first argument rested on a claim that the courts at Westminster should
defer to those in Canada; after all, the Canadian courts were vested
with habeas jurisdiction and were open to entertain any claims AnderId. at 599.
See id. at 600.
102
Id.
103
In both Mostyn and Cooke, the King's Bench concluded that its legislative jurisdiction extended to events that occurred in British enclaves and protectorates overseas. Judicial jurisdiction, in contrast, depended on the ability of the plaintiff to serve the defendant
with process in England itself. Both Mostyn and Cooke featured claims against defendants
who had since returned to England and were subject to the power of the superior courts
there. It followed that, with both legislative and judicial jurisdiction, the superior courts
faced no obstacle to the adjudication of these claims.
104
(1861) 30 Eng. Rep. 129 (L.J.Q.B.).
105
See generally Robert C. Reinders, The John Anderson Case, 1860-1: A Study in AngloCanadianImperial Relations, 56 CAN. HIST. REV. 393 (1975) (describing the background of
the litigation and the reaction of the press in both England and Canada).
100

101

514
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son might assert, subject to ultimate review in the Privy Council. 106 By
conducting direct judicial supervision of detention in Canada in an
original proceeding, the Queen's Bench in England inserted itself
into the middle of an ongoing litigation and offended Canadian dignity and notions of self-government. 10 7 The second argument rested
on the inability of the Queen's Bench to enforce its order through the
issuance of a body attachment-the traditional remedy for official
noncompliance with a habeas directive. 0 8 Acknowledging both difficulties, the court concluded that it lacked discretion to decline the
writ and that it could fairly rely on Canadian officials to enforce its
judgments.1 0 9 It thus established an important precedent for broad
exercise of habeas jurisdiction.' 1 0
Subsequent decisions extended the scope of habeas jurisdiction
throughout the British Empire as a check on military government. Although Parliament quickly provided a statutory basis for the Queen's
Bench to defer to any established local court system, such as that in
Canada, the new legislation otherwise left intact the habeas jurisdiction of the courts at Westminster and confirmed that the writ would
run into those parts of the British Empire where no local court system
had been established.1 1 ' Two cases help to illustrate that principle.
The first arose from the indefinite detention of a local chieftain in the
British protectorate of Bechuanaland, in what we know today as the
African nation of Botswana.' 2 The chieftain, one Sekgome, sought
habeas relief in the King's Bench in London in a proceeding brought
against the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the official in London
directly responsible for oversight of colonial affairs.1 1 3 Although the
King's Bench ultimately upheld the detention order as valid, the
judges suggested in dicta that the writ would run to test the legality of
confinement, either to the Secretary or to the High Commissioner as
the person with control (if not custody) of the petitioner.1 14 Subsequent cases confirmed this dicta, holding that an official in London
106
As the Queen's Bench explained, it was aware that the decision might be seen as
"inconsistent with that higher degree of colonial independence, both legislative and judicial, which has happily been carried into effect in modern times." Anderson, 30 Eng. Rep.
at 132.
107
See Reinders, supra note 105, at 409.
Anderson, 30 Eng. Rep. at 131-32.
108
109
Id. at 132.
110 See Norman Bentwich, Habeas Corpus in the Empire, 27 L.Q. REv. 454, 455 (1911)
(describing the case and the legislature's subsequent action to prevent further issuance of
the writ to a colony).
111
See Habeas Corpus Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 20 (Eng.). For an account, see
Reinders, supra note 105, at 412-13.
112
See Rex v. Earl of Crewe, (1910) 2 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B).
113
Id. at 576-77.
114 See id. at 592-93 (Lord Vaughan Williams); id. at 618 (Lord Farwell). But see id. at
629 (Lord Kennedy, dissenting).

2006]

THE LIMITS OF HABEAS JURISDICTION

515

would serve as a proper respondent for a habeas petition aimed at
1 15
challenging detention in a British protectorate overseas.
In the British Empire, then, the courts at Westminster exercised
legislative jurisdiction over events anywhere in the world that they regarded as properly subject to the laws of the realm. Military detention
overseas clearly came within the scope of matters that the superior
courts regarded as governed by British law. The basis forjudicialjurisdiction varied somewhat. Sometimes the superior courts based their
exercise of judicial power in trespass litigation on the presence of the
defendant in Britain; 1 6 sometimes, as in Ex parte Anderson, the courts
actually issued the writ to custodians overseas;' 17 sometimes they proceeded against high government officials in Britain, who were bound
to comply with judicial decrees.118 One finds little evidence of a reluctance to assert jurisdiction over the claims of non-native subjects of
Britain. Just as the court in Ex parte Anderson viewed a runaway slave as
entitled to the writ, 119 so too did the courts in the African colonial
cases entertain the petitions of conquered tribal leaders. 120 While
British law may have regarded all such petitioners as subjects of Britain, in the sense that they all owed obedience to the Crown, the evident trigger for the exercise of jurisdiction was the simple fact of
wrongful detention.
B.

Common Law Jurisdictional Norms in the United States

Upon declaring independence, the United States borrowed both
the English Articles of War and England's reliance upon the civilian
courts to keep courts martial within the bounds of their jurisdiction.
An early decision by Chief Justice Marshall, Wise v. Withers, squarely
held that courts martial lacked jurisdiction to punish individuals who
were not properly subject to military discipline.1 2 1 Furthermore, the
Chief Justice ruled that the members of the court martial were subject
to suit for damages as trespassers for exceeding the boundaries of
their authority. 122 Later cases made clear that individuals could seek
relief from wrongful military detention by challenging the authority of
115 For an account, see ROBERTS-WRAY, supra note 92, at 611-15; Bentwich, supra note
110, at 454.
116
See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The
"Power"Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
117
See, e.g., ROBERTS-WRAY, supra note 92, at 612.
118
See id. at 612-15.
119 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., ROBERTS-WRAY, supra note 92, at 612-15; supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
121
See 7 U.S.(3 Cranch) 331, 337 (1806).
122

Id.
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courts martial through petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 123 As in
England, then, trespass and habeas provided two complementary
forms of action by which an individual might challenge unlawful military detention.
The courts of the United States had few occasions to consider the
legality of military detention overseas during the nineteenth century.
Most military activity occurred within the nation's own borders. But a
handful of nineteenth-century cases in Indian territory establish the
willingness of the federal courts to entertain habeas and trespass
claims to vindicate the interests of those wrongfully subjected to military authority. 124 Perhaps most noteworthy, the Circuit Court of the
District of Nebraska ruled that Native American members of the
Ponca Tribe were entitled to habeas relief from military detention
aimed at removing them from the Omaha reservation in Nebraska
and returning them to their former reservation in Indian country
(Oklahoma).1 25 In so ruling, the court found that Native Americans
enjoyed a right to petition for habeas, rejecting the government's argument that the privilege extended only to citizens of the United
States. 126 The court also found that the military had failed to act
within the bounds of law in detaining tribal members for purposes of
an unjustified removal.1 27 In permitting noncitizens to petition, such
rulings confirmed a series of decisions that had permitted aliens to
1 28
invoke the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The nation's first wide-scale experience with overseas military detention dates from the immediate aftermath of World War II. Both in
Japan and Germany, the victorious Allied Powers convened military
tribunals to hear a series of war crime cases against former officers of
the defeated nations (and others).129 Those convicted of war crimes
123 See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The AntitheticalElements of Military Governance in a MadisonianDemocracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. Riv. 649, 725-30 (2002) (discussing a famous case dating from the War of 1812, in which AndrewJackson ordered the
imprisonment and deportation of a judge in New Orleans, who subsequently challenged
the legality ofJackson's imposition of martial law and obtained a sizable award of damages
that Congress later agreed to pay on behalf of Jackson).
124
See, e.g., Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1877); Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas.
412, 414 (C.C.D. Or. 1877) (No. 17,265); In re Carr, 5 F. Cas. 115, 115-16 (C.C.D. Or.
1875) (No. 2,432).
125
See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 696-97 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879) (No. 14,891).
126
See id. at 700.
127

Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1888); Chew Heong
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 538 (1884); see also Clarke v. Morey, 10Johns. 69 (N.Y. 1813)
(refusing to treat plaintiffs status as a British subject as a bar to suit in American courts,
despite the pendency of the War of 1812 with Great Britain).
129
See Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the ConstitutionFollowing the Hag, I STAN.
L. REv. 587, 608-13 (1948); Dallin Oaks, The "Original"Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 153, 169-73. Fairman distinguishes the courts that the Allies
128
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and other offenses filed a series of petitions with the Supreme Court,
raising a host of challenges to the legality of the military tribunals. 3"
For the most part, the Court declined to hear these petitions, concluding that direct review of the decisions of military tribunals in Europe
would call for a forbidden exercise of its original jurisdiction.' 3'

So

long as the Court adheres to this view, both aliens and citizens detained abroad may have difficulty in persuading the Court to assert
original jurisdiction over their habeas petitions (except in the unlikely
event that the petitions fall within one of two narrow categories of
original jurisdiction conferred in Article III).132 Ordinarily, parties
can sidestep this restriction on the Court's original jurisdiction by first
commencing suit in a lower federal court and subsequently invoking
the Court's appellate jurisdiction to review any lower court disposition. 133 But the statutory restrictions on the ambit of the district
court's habeas jurisdiction were seen as an obstacle to asserting jurisdiction over the custodian of petitioners detained overseas.13 4 Some
members of the Court responded to the petitions of the German war
established as part of their occupation of Italy and Germany (Allied Military Government)
from those that it established at Nuremburg to try war criminals (War Crimes Tribunals).
See Fairman, supra. Ultimately, the U.S. federal courts concluded that the tribunals at
Nuremburg were not tribunals of the United States, and thus were not subject to review by
Article III courts. See Ex parte Flick, 76 F. Supp. 979, 981 (D.D.C. 1948).
130
See generally Fairman, supra note 129, at 589 (reporting that petitions were filed
both on behalf of German andJapanese nationals who were convicted of war crimes and by
some American citizens whom occupation courts had convicted of more mundane postwar
crimes).
131
See id. at 591. Familiar decisions restrict the Court's ability to exercise originaljurisdiction except in the cases identified in the Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). Nonetheless, an original petition may invoke the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, so long as the petition seeks the functional equivalent of appellate
review. SeeExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 77 (1807). Ordinarily, that means the
petitioner must first seek review before another federal tribunal before filing a petition
with the Supreme Court. SeeJames E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Strippingand the Supreme Court's
Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1465-99 (2000). As applied to the
German war crime petitions, the principle of limited original jurisdiction was seen as a
barrier to direct Supreme Court supervision. See Ex pante Betz, 329 U.S. 672, 672 (1946); see
also In re Dammann 336 U.S. 922, 922 (1949) (dismissing petition for want of original
jurisdiction); Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824, 824 (1948) (denying leave to file original
petition for habeas review and noting that four Justices would have set the case for argument on the jurisdictional issue).
132
Cf Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (refusing to exercise original
jurisdiction over a petition seeking review of the International Military Tribunal's convictions in the Far East, concluding that the tribunal was not a U.S. tribunal but rather was
one established by the Allied Powers).
133
See, e.g., In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1946).
134
The relevant statute, empowering the district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus
only within their respective jurisdictions, was later codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Court similarly viewed § 2241 (a) as an obstacle to jurisdiction,
stating, "[J]urisdiction over Padilla's habeas petition lies in the Southern District [of New
York] only if it has jurisdiction over [Padilla's custodian]"; the Court concluded that it did
not. 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).

518

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:497

criminals by calling for briefs on the issue of what court would have
3 5
power to hear the petitions.1
These issues came to a head in Johnson v. Eisentrager.3 6 The petitioners were German nationals captured in China and charged with
conducting bellicose activities on behalf of the Axis powers after the
war's official end. 13 7 After their conviction and transfer to Germany
for imprisonment, they sought habeas relief in the District Court of
the District of Columbia, which dismissed the petition, emphasizing
jurisdictional problems.'13
The court of appeals reversed in a decision that framed the Supreme Court's response. 13 9 Writing for the
appellate panel, Judge Prettyman noted the problems associated with
the power of the district courts to exercise original habeas jurisdiction
over detention in Germany. 1 40 He also noted the Supreme Court's
own inability to entertain original habeas petitions to review executive
detention. 14 ' These gaps in jurisdiction threatened to foreclose
habeas review altogether, an outcome that Judge Prettyman viewed as
incompatible with the constitutional prohibition against the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 142 Judge Prettyman
accordingly invoked first principles in arguing that the petitioners'
right to federal judicial consideration of their constitutional claims ne1 43
cessitated a finding of jurisdiction in the lower court.
The Court rejected this proposed emphasis on first principles. In
a wide-ranging opinion, Justice Jackson concluded that the German
petitioners had no right to be released from their detention overseas. 144 Despite reciting a variety of territorial considerations, the
Court carefully avoided deciding on the ground that the federal
courts could not exercise judicial and legislative jurisdiction over the
legality of detention at a prison in occupied Germany. 145 Early in its
opinion, the Court assumed that while the district court could not
issue process to the immediate custodian in Germany, it could assert
authority over the Secretary of Defense and other military officials in
135
See, e.g., Everett, 334 U.S. at 824-25. Justice Douglas later argued that the district
court would have jurisdiction over such cases, notwithstanding the statutory restriction. See
Hirota, 339 U.S. at 199-200 (Douglas, J., concurring).
136
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
137
See id. at 765-66.
138
See id. at 767 (describing the district court as dismissing the habeas petition on the
basis of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)).
139
See Eisentrager v. Forrestol, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), reu'd sub nom. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763.
140
See id. at 967.
141
See id.
142
See id. at 965.
143
See id.
144
See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 790-91.
145
See id. at 768.
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Washington, D.C. 146 It further assumed that such respondents would
have lawful authority to effect the release of the petitioners. 14 7 The
Court regarded these procedural niceties as grounding the judicial
power sufficiently to authorize the federal courts to consider all of the
contentions that the petitioners had advanced.148 After doing so, the
Court arrived at its conclusion: "[N]o right to the writ of habeas
1 49

corpus appears."'

In reaching the merits and dismissing the petition on that basis,
the Court assumed the existence ofjudicial jurisdiction. On the issues
of legislative jurisdiction and the application of federal law to events
overseas, the Court offered a more mixed account. On the one hand,
the Court denied that many of the rights said to be grounded in federal law actually extended to the alien petitioners in the circumstances
of the particular case. 150 The Court's rationale was partly territorial,
expressing a reluctance to extend constitutional rights to detainees
overseas.1 5 1 The decision also rested, however, on judicial deference
to the exercise of military authority in the aftermath of a shooting war.
On the other hand, despite this posture of deference, the Court
took pains in reviewing the petitioners' constitutional and jurisdictional claims.' 52 Perhaps most revealing was the care with which the
Court considered the claim that the tribunals had exceeded the scope
of their rightful authority.' 53 Although it articulated a narrow scope
of review, the Court agreed to consider "the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged."' 154 Such an inquiry presupposes a power to intervene judicially had the tribunals
overstepped their boundaries. 155 In other words, the Court stood
ready to perform its traditional function as a superior court of civil
jurisdiction to review the work of military tribunals and to keep them
within the bounds of their authority. In the end, then, Eisentragerassumed that the federal courts had both judicial and legislative jurisdicSee id. at 769.
Id. at 766-67.
148
See id. at 767.
149
Id. at 781.
150
See id. at 785.
151
Id. at 783-85. Thus, the Court made reference to territoriality in the course of
rejecting the claim that the Constitution established rights of personal security or immunity from military trial for the benefit of alien enemies detained and convicted overseas.
See id.
152
See id. at 778-91.
153
See id. at 785-88.
154
Id. at 787.
155
That presupposition lay at the heart of the Court's rejection of the government's
position in Rasul. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 & n.15 (2004). Against this
backdrop of considered review and rejection on the merits, the government's decision in
Rasul to portray Eisentrageras a flat barrier to judicial jurisdiction looks particularly adventuresome. See id. at 478-79.
146

147
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tion to review the work of military tribunals. The case was less about
territorial limits than about the proper role of federal courts in reviewing the actions of the military. Thus, the Court described the "ultimate question" in the case as one of the 'jurisdiction of civil courts of
156
the United States vis-4-vis military authorities."
It could hardly have been otherwise. As was the case in England,
when the United States mounts a military operation overseas, the Constitution and laws of the United States control every move. The Constitution structures the war power in various well-known particulars,
and federal laws control every facet of military life, from the role of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff down the chain of command to the actions of
the soldier in the field. To be sure, the federal courts do not play a
significant role in overseeing compliance with this complex body of
military law; that is the job of the military justice system and courts
martial. But the federal courts police the boundaries of military justice, preventing the application of military law to those not properly
subject to its terms. 157 When the military operates overseas, it remains
subject to the judicial power just as it remains subject to the President's power as Commander-in-Chief.
C.

Exploring the Limits of Legislative Jurisdiction

Rasul makes explicit what Eisentrager had implied, empowering
federal judges to exercise judicial jurisdiction in conducting an inquiry into the legality of military detention overseas.1 58 As in Eisentrager, the action in Rasul against high government officials in
Washington, D.C. was seen as grounding the judicial jurisdiction of
the federal courts, empowering them to reach the merits.1 59 In conducting such review, federal courts must now determine what federal
standards, if any, apply to military detention overseas. A full review of
the complex body of law that governs the extraterritorial application
of the Constitution and laws of the United States lies beyond the
scope of this essay. 160 But this subpart will nonetheless offer a brief
sketch of some of the considerations that may shape decisions about
when to apply the law of the United States.
1.

Military Bases or Enclaves

The Rasul decision answers the judicial-jurisdiction question, but
leaves open the problem of what law governs the legality of detention
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 765.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13, 23 (1955).
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
See id. at 474-75.
160 An overview of some of the relevant issues appears in Roosevelt, supra note 9, at
2030-41.
156

157
158
159
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and interrogation at Guantanamo Bay and other military bases
around the world. Questions concerning the application of U.S. law
to nonresident aliens detained at such facilities arose on remand in
the Rasul case. One can approach such questions by beginning with
the presumption that the common law applies to the exercise of military authority overseas. To be sure, the common law permitted military officers to justify their action by reference to local law, and thus
acknowledged that local law might offer a defense or justification for
particular actions. 6 But the common law also rejected the idea that
the military could establish a lawless enclave in which the executive
branch officials in charge were a law unto themselves.1 62 This rejection of the lawless enclave provides an appropriate starting point for
163
the analysis of military detention at bases around the world.
A presumption in favor of the application of U.S. law would invite
a range of responses. The government might attempt to show that
64
another body of local law regulates the conduct of the U.S. military. 1
Such a showing of a competing, and possibly conflicting, body of local
law might well rebut the presumption and lead U.S. courts to conclude that U.S. law does not apply. But the United States has taken
pains to ensure that U.S. law applies to service members stationed
abroad in such countries as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan.1 65 Under the terms of status of forces agreements (SOFAs), service members bear criminal responsibility for violations of both the
U.S. and local law of the country in which they serve.1 6 6 While service
161 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 87-92.
163 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LovotA L. REv.
1, 44 (2004) (arguing for the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to prevent the creation
of lawless enclaves).
164
As an alternative, the government could attempt to justify the detention by reference to U.S. law. Among other doctrines, the government would presumably invoke the
separation of powers and political question doctrines, the territorial limits on the Constitution's application overseas, and the inability of nonresident aliens to rely on other U.S.
constitutional and statutory protections. Whatever the merit of these arguments, they differ importantly from the claim that U.S. law simply does not apply to military enclaves.
165 The Bush Administration's antipathy toward the International Criminal Court
(ICC) flows in part from concern that acceptance of ICC jurisdiction may erode the
United States' ability to ensure that U.S. criminal standards are applied to the conduct of
service members overseas. SeeJohn R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks to the Federalist Society: The United States and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.
htm. The United Kingdom recently announced that it would commence war crime prosecutions against certain of its service members in connection with their alleged murder of
prisoners in Afghanistan, but that such prosecutions would go forward in U.K. courts. See
Philippe Sands, So This Is the Real Reason the Generals Are Up in Arms, INDEP. ON SUNDAY
(U.K.),July 24, 2005, at 27, available at 2005 WLNR 11588109.
166 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Regarding the Status of Their Forces art. VII,June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67
[hereinafter NATO SOFA]. Many SOFAs have been modeled upon the SOFA that governs
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members may face local criminal responsibility, the military has long
taken the position that it enjoys primary responsibility to regulate the
conduct of service members working on military bases and enclaves.1 6 7 In rejecting the application of local law at such bases as a
general matter, the government may find it difficult to invoke conflicting local law as a bar to the application of U.S. legal rules to military
bases overseas.' 68 In other words, it seems clear that U.S. law would
govern the criminal liability, if any, of military and civilian personnel
for abuse of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.1 69 Because U.S. law governs the treatment of detainees, it should also govern the legality of
70
their detention.
NATO troops. See generally Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharingof Sovereign Prerogative,37 A.F. L. REv. 137, 148-53 (1994) (describing the typical factors that SOFAs address). Under the NATO SOFA, U.S. service members working overseas may be
prosecuted for violations of U.S. law if local law does not apply, and for violations of local
law if U.S. law does not apply. See NATO SOFA, supra, art. VII, § 2. In cases in which the
conduct violates both U.S. law and local law, U.S. law presumptively applies if the conduct
victimizes a U.S. national or occurs in the course of official duties. See id. art. VII, § 3. Offduty criminal conduct directed at foreign nationals falls presumptively to local prosecution. See Erickson, supra. While SOFAs ordinarily include certain safeguards for service
members prosecuted for violations of local law, U.S. constitutional assurances do not extend to such prosecutions. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1957).
167 See Girard, 354 U.S. at 529-30.
168 At Guantanamo Bay, for example, service members would face liability before
courts martial for any misconduct they commit. Civilian employees of the military and
other operatives who do not belong to the armed forces, however, would face criminal
accountability under the terms of a criminal statute that extends U.S. criminal law to the
special maritime and territorial jurisdictions of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)
(2000). U.S. law thus controls the conduct of U.S. civilians and aliens housed at Guantanamo Bay. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992).
169
Civilian employees of the armed forces and other personnel who lack a service
connection may not be prosecuted before courts martial. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16
(1957). To fill this gap in the application of U.S. law to civilian employees overseas, Congress recently adopted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000)). The Act makes domestic federal criminal standards applicable to civilians overseas and subjects these civilians to
prosecution before the courts of the United States for any violations they commit. See
Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in CriminalJurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the
Armed ForcesAbroad: A FirstPersonAccount of the Creation of the Military ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Act of 2001, 51 CAT". U. L. REv. 55, 55 (2001); MarkJ. Yost & Douglas S. Anderson, The
Military ExtraterritorialJurisdictionAct of 2000: Closing the Gap, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 446, 449
(2001). Notably, the Act does not limit its application of U.S. law to territories or enclaves
of the United States, but applies wherever such civilians are employed. See Yost & Anderson, supra.
170
A somewhat similar problem of extraterritoriality arises under the European Convention on Human Rights, which establishes human rights assurances applicable to the
jurisdiction of a member state. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signatureNov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Under decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, a member state may act within its
jurisdiction when it exercises military or security control over a situation outside the territorial boundaries of the member state. Thus, the Court held that the Convention applied
to Turkey's actions in Kenya, where a leader of the Kurdish workers' party was transferred
into the custody of Turkey's security forces. See Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99
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Detention by Foreign Governments

The global war on terror has apparently resulted in the detention
and interrogation of suspected terrorists in U.S.-run facilities abroad
and in the facilities of friendly foreign governments. In one important case, Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, Saudi government officials took a U.S.
citizen studying in Saudi Arabia into custody and held the student in a
Saudi detention facility for several months. 17 1 The petitioner's parents, acting as next friends, filed a petition for habeas relief in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the U.S. government directed the petitioner's arrest and detention. 72 In response, the government challenged the district court's territorial
jurisdiction over detention facilities overseas and argued that it did
73
not have actual "custody" of the petitioner for habeas purposes.
The district court refused to dismiss on either point, applying the
overseas exception from RasuP74 and concluding that the petitioner
175
had made out a plausible claim of constructive custody.
Such a decision makes a good deal of sense. To be sure, habeas
jurisdiction has traditionally included a custody requirement, limiting
the issuance of the writ to the party with some degree of custody of
the petitioner.176 But today, habeas litigation does not invariably require in-court production of the petitioner and does not often result
in unconditional release orders. Relaxation of the custody requirement to permit challenges in constructive-custody cases enables the
habeas petitioner to probe the extent of the U.S. government's re(Eur. Ct. H.R. May 12, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=HUdocen; see also Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96 (Nov. 16, 2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp197/search.asp?skin=HUdoc-en (concluding that the Convention could apply, on a theory of effective control, to a military incursion by Turkey into northern Iraq). See generally
Philip Leach, The British Military in Iraq: The Applicability of the Espace Juridique Doctrine
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 2005 PuB. L. 448, available at http://www.
londonmet.ac.uk/londonmet/library/i86023-24.doc (arguing for the application of the
Convention to British military action in Iraq on a theory of effective control).
171
350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2004).
172

173
174
175

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 30, 38.
Id. at 44.

See id. at 50. Following the district court decision, the federal government secured
the release of Abu Ali from Saudi authority and brought him to Arlington, Virginia to face
federal criminal charges that he provided material support to a terrorist organization,
namely al Qaeda. Eric Lichtblau, American Accused of a Plot to Assassinate Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2005, at Al. The indictment alleged that while a student in Saudi Arabia, he
joined with other al Qaeda members or sympathizers in discussing a plot to assassinate
President George W. Bush. Id.
176 Such a custody requirement arose at a time when the writ precipitated the production of the petitioner in court upon pain of contempt; a respondent who lacked custody
could neither be fairly charged with the production (or release) of the petitioner nor
threatened with contempt sanctions for failing to do so. But custody requirements did not
apply with the same severity in all circumstances. For more on the custody requirement
and its evolution in the British Empire, see supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
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sponsibility for his detention and to secure relief for any improper
government conduct. The foreign government may ultimately decide
to prosecute the petitioner or to impose further detention in accordance with its own law, and a federal court would have no role in
overseeing such decisions. 1 77 But by permitting a challenge to the actions of the U.S. government in securing detention overseas, the decision helps to prevent the simple fact of foreign custody from being
used to bypass otherwise applicable limits on the federal government's
178
power to detain and interrogate.
3.

Oversight of Military TribunaLs

Litigation over the legality of military tribunals in Japan and Germany after World War II provides some guidance as to the scope of
federal judicial oversight of the legality of military tribunals on foreign
soil. In general, the Supreme Court reached the merits of challenges
to the tribunals that had been erected entirely under the authority of
the U.S. government. 179 Such U.S. tribunals were seen as necessarily
subordinate to the courts of the United States, at least with respect to
claims that the military lacked proper authority to establish such tribunals or that, once established, the tribunals had exceeded the limits of
their authority.' 8 0 By contrast, the Court refused to authorize review
of the tribunals that had been erected through the joint authority of
the Allied command. 18 1 The Court's reluctance to claim a role in the
oversight of an international tribunal, as opposed to one erected by
the United States, reflects a more general reluctance to review the
18 2
work of international adjudicative bodies.
177

See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529-530 (1957).
Despite its expansion of notions of custody, the decision finds some support in the
history of habeas corpus. Common law custody rules invited the British Crown to evade
habeas remedies in the seventeenth century through shifting custody from jail to jail or
transferring prisoners to Scotland for detention. See R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS
CORPUS 18 (2d ed. 1989).
In response to these and other perceived threats to liberty,
Parliament adopted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which included a provision that made
the practice of removing prisoners from the jurisdiction to deprive them of habeas a serious offense. See id. at 199.
179
See, e.g.,Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950).
180 See id. at 766-67.
181
See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948); see also Fairman, supra note 129,
at 615 (observing that "[t]he International Military Tribunal which sat at Ntornberg... was
no more subject to American law or judicial review than to the control of the three other
Governments participating in the Tribunal").
182
See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 13, at 768. On the preference in international law for
reliance on civilian courts, as opposed to military tribunals, in the imposition of criminal
sanctions, see, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, cpenedfor signatureNov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 10, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). The European Court of Human Rights has construed the independent and impartial tribunal rule of Article 6 to foreclose adjudication of criminal charges
178
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III
LITIGATING OVERSEAS DETENTION CASES: THE
NONSTATUTORY ALTERNATIVE

While history provides strong support for the application of U.S.
law to determine the legality of U.S. military detention overseas, identifying the statutory predicate for such litigation presents a puzzle.
The habeas statute authorizes district courts (and other federal
judges) to grant writs of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions."' 3 But the territorial jurisdiction of the district courts ends
184
at the borders of the United States, and does not extend overseas.
To be sure, Rasul and Padillacontinue the practice of recognizing an
overseas exception to this territorial restriction. But this exception
remains controversial and gives rise to the venue issues that Justice
Scalia identified in his Rasul dissent and that Justice Kennedy sought
185
to address in his Padilla concurrence.
Rather than struggle to identify an exception to the territorial
limits of the habeas statute, this Part proposes to give these limits literal effect in overseas cases. Such an interpretation would restrict the
power of the district courts to "grant" writs of habeas corpus outside
the United States, as Justice Scalia argued. But it would not bar the
district courts from entertaining suits and proceedings to test the legality of the government's policy of overseas detention. Lacking
before military tribunals, see, e.g.,
Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 93, and tribunals on which military officials sit as judges, see Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, para.
118 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 12, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=
HUdoc-en (search by Application Number). In dealing with terrorists, it is possible that
nations will opt for a military model of interdiction and punishment rather than a civilian
model of reliance upon criminal law processes. For an account of the challenges such a
switch to a military model poses for human rights regimes, see Gerald L. Neuman, CounterTerrorist Operations and the Rule of Law, 15 EUR. J. INr'L L. 1019 (2004).
183 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).
184 Federal law defines the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States in
territorial terms, typically by specifying particular counties of a state as a judicial district.
See id. §§ 81-131. District courts have been established in all fifty states, Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia. See id. District courts thus lack territorial jurisdiction over places,
including Guantanamo Bay, that have not been incorporated into and made a part of the
U.S. judicial system. This territorial definition of district court authority, when coupled
with the restrictive language of the habeas statute, gives rise to the district-of-confinement
rule. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442-43 (2004). As explained below, the rule
grows out of the perceived inconvenience associated with the use of habeas as a form of
judicial process commanding the production of the prisoner. See infta notes 221-24. The
district-of-confinement rule thus operates as a rule ofjudicial jurisdiction, as Justice Kennedy suggested. See Padilla,542 U.S. at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The rule differs
from the ordinary presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Cf Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating that "legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States"). See generally William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 85 (1998).
185 See supra notes 28-29, 60-63 and accompanying text.
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habeas authority, district courts still enjoy ample power to hear civil
actions for declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
including claims to enjoin government officials from detention practices that violate federal rights. The proposal to reconceptualize overseas detention litigation as a suit for injunctive and declaratory relief
offers a more coherent account of what the courts actually do than the
continued reliance upon an under-theorized and textually questionable overseas habeas exception.1 s 6
This Part begins with a description of the case for recognizing the
proposed equitable or nonstatutory alternative to habeas litigation. It
then considers predictable arguments against such an approach, including arguments based upon the idea that habeas corpus provides
the exclusive remedy for claims challenging the constitutionality of
current confinement.
A.

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief as an Alternative to Habeas
Corpus

One can understand a challenge to overseas confinement as a
suit for injunctive and declaratory relief from unconstitutional government action. Under the general grant of federal question jurisdiction,
the federal district courts enjoy subject matter jurisdiction over cases
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States. 18 7 The fact that the detention in question takes place overseas
does not affect the availability of subject matter jurisdiction. To be
sure, the Court has limited the overseas application of some federal
statutes (particularly in the employment area) ,188 and it has sometimes treated issues of extraterritorial application as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 9 Most scholars agree, however, that
extraterritorial application presents not a question of subject matter
jurisdiction, but rather a question of legislative jurisdiction that determines the plaintiff's ability to state a claim for relief. 190 Thus, even
assuming that a challenge to the legality of military detention presents
186 At the same time, reliance upon nonstatutory review for overseas litigation need
not pose any threat to the district-of-confinement and immediate-custodian rules as they
apply to litigation over detention in the United States.
187
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In 1976, Congress amended the general federal question statute to eliminate an amount-in-controversy requirement of $10,000 in federal government
litigation. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a)). The amendment secured federal jurisdiction for all federal claims
against federal officials and the government, including claims to challenge the legality of
administrative action that might otherwise have failed to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold.
See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
188
See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249-50 (1991).
189 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
190
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law After the Insurance
Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. CoMP. INT'L. L. 750, 750 n.3 (1995).
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a question involving the extraterritorial application of U.S. law,' 9 '
such extraterritoriality would not threaten the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction.
To establish the existence of a right of action, plaintiffs seeking
relief against overseas confinement may pursue nonstatutory review of
agency action. 92 Originally based upon the presumptive availability
of suits for injunctive and declaratory relief and on such remedies as
the writ of mandamus, nonstatutory review provides litigants with a
right of action to challenge the legality of government action in circumstances in which Congress has failed to make explicit statutory
provision for judicial oversight. 193 Today, Congress has enshrined
nonstatutory review in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
establishes a presumption in favor of judicial review as a basic principle of federal law. ' 94 Even assuming the inapplicability of the APA to
certain aspects of the nation's national security apparatus, 95 the tradition of nonstatutory review would provide the basis for a legal chal96
lenge to the constitutionality of detention.
191
One might argue that an action against the Defense Department to challenge a
policy of military detention formulated in Washington, D.C. does not present a genuine
case of extraterritoriality, even when the detention itself takes place overseas. Cf Envd.
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 536-537 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that an agency's
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement occurred in the United States, and
rejecting the "proposition that [such] conduct occurring within the United States is rendered exempt from otherwise applicable statutes merely because the effects of its compliance would be felt [outside the nation's boundaries]").
192 We associate the right of action to enjoin unconstitutional state action with the
decision in Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 152 (1908). Parties may also seek to enjoin federal
governmental officials from taking action in violation of federal rights. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290 (1944).
193
For an overview of nonstatutory review, see Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATwE ACTION (1965), and Clark Byse &Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Man-

damus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutoty"JudicialReview ofFederalAdministrative Action,
81 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1967).

194 Section 10 of the APA establishes a presumption in favor of judicial review, either
under any special statute that Congress has provided or by reliance upon suits for declaratory and injunctive relief or upon other forms of nonstatutory review. See Administrative
Procedure Act § 10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2000). The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (2000), provides the district courts, in cases of actual controversy, with authority to
declare the rights and legal relations of the parties. While these statutes do not confer
subject matter jurisdiction, see Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) (APA); Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950) (Declaratory Judgment Act),
they either create or assume the existence of nonstatutory federal rights of action to secure
relief from illegal federal government action, see, e.g., Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671-72.
195 See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (exploring in dicta the
scope of the APA exception for military action in the field of battle); see also Jonathan
Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
441, 512-15 (2005) (discussing possible exceptions that might "exempt a military agency
...from APA strictures").
196 The fundamental basis for nonstatutory review traces to the willingness of courts,
applying common law precepts, to recognize a right of action against a government official
to protect a legal right. See Byse & Fiocca, supra note 193, at 321-22. Individuals detained
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Federal courts in the District of Columbia have long assumed that
the right to judicial review extends to suits seeking to challenge government action either taken overseas or affecting suitors there. In
Rusk v. Cort, for example, the plaintiff sought to challenge loss of citizenship imposed upon him for failing to return to the United States
to report to his draft board.19 7 Rather than requiring the plaintiff to
return to the United States and submit to a complex review process
under immigration laws, the Supreme Court allowed him to file an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of
State in the District of Columbia. 198 Nonstatutory review has also
been made available to permit district courts in the District of Columbia to entertain constitutional challenges to decisions of the High
Court of the Territory of American Samoa.' 9 9 The actions themselves
go forward against the Secretary of the Interior, a cabinet-level official
residing in the District of Columbia, and they rest upon the assumption that the Secretary enjoys the authority to compel the High Court
to bring its decisions into conformity with law. 20 0 Nonstatutory review
thus provides the gap-filling vehicle by which individuals alleging a
constitutional violation to which no mode of statutory review applies
may bring their claims to federal court.
Other procedural aspects of the litigation would seem quite
straightforward. Just as in habeas litigation generally, high government officials in Washington, D.C.2 0 1 cannot invoke the doctrine of
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States would certainly qualify as having suffered a private wrong entitling them to damages. For an example of the Court's
willingness to recognize nonstatutory review as a tool to remedy alleged constitutional violations, see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988).
197 369 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1962). Although the Califano Court later withdrew the APA
as the source of subject matter jurisdiction for its decision in Rusk, it based its decision on
the availability of general federal question jurisdiction as an alternative source of authority.
See Califano, 430 U.S. at 105-06. Califanothus leaves intact the Rusk Court's conclusion that
the plaintiff had a right of action to pursue such relief against the government.
198 See Rusk, 369 U.S. at 379-80.
199 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held that district courts
may entertain actions in the nature of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior to
facilitate judicial review of High Court decisions. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 387 (D.C. Cir.
1987). For an account, see Pfander, supra note 13, at 752-54. The reliance on mandamus
was necessitated by the failure of Congress to craft an organic act for American Samoa with
the usual provisions for appellate review of territorial judicial decisions. See id.
20
See Hode4 830 F.2d at 376. Such review enables the federal courts to hear claims
that the High Court-sitting in Samoa, itself several thousand miles away from the nation's
capital-failed to give effect to binding rules of U.S. constitutional law in the course of its
decisions. See id. at 386-87. In the course of such litigation, federal courts must determine
the extent to which constitutional guarantees apply in American Samoa (under the doctrine of incorporation) and must pass on claims of constitutional violation. See id. at 368.
201
The Court has long since approved of the power of litigants to name high government officials in suits for injunctive and declaratory relief, at least outside the habeas context. See, e.g., Webster, 486 U.S. 592; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
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official immunity against constitutional challenges to government action. 20 2 Venue would often be appropriate in the District of Columbia
as the place where most such officials reside and as the only place in
the United States in which any substantial event might be said to have
taken place for venue purposes. 20 3 Service on the government official, with a copy to the Attorney General of the United States, would
20 4
suffice to confer personal jurisdiction on the district courts.
B.

Habeas Does Not Displace Nonstatutory Review

However plausible, such an equitable model of overseas detention litigation must confront the negative implications of the habeas
statute and the doctrine of habeas exclusivity. If the habeas statute
denies the district courts power to entertain habeas petitions in cases
involving overseas detention, critics may argue that the same restriction would bar equitable claims that seek the functional equivalent of
habeas relief. Critics might bolster this argument against allowing an
end-run around the territorial limits of the habeas statute by drawing
on a doctrine of habeas exclusivity that the Supreme Court has devel20 5
oped and extended in recent years. Beginning in Preiserv. Rodriguez
and continuing in Heck v. Humphrey,20 6 the Court has treated habeas
corpus as the exclusive federal judicial remedy for prisoners who wish
to challenge state court convictions and has forbidden petitioners
from switching to alternative forms of relief, such as actions under
§ 1983.207 If habeas provides the sole remedy for wrongful detention,
582 (1952); cf Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 n.8 (2004) (refusing to resolve a split
in the circuits as to whether immigrants may name the Attorney General of the United
States in a habeas litigation challenging deportation).
202 Although officials in the executive branch enjoy qualified immunity from a suit for
damages, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 497 (1978), the immunity does not apply to suits for injunctive and declaratory relief
or to actions in the nature of mandamus, see Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. Co., 305 U.S.
177, 183-84 (1938) (injunctive relief); Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 472-74 (1920)
(mandamus). While later decisions invoked sovereign immunity when alternative remedies at law were judged adequate, see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 697 n.18 (1949), the broad waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA essentially
moots the problem, see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 960, 968-69 (5th ed. 2003).
203
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000). Of course, the plaintiff in such an action may claim

that venue would be proper in a judicial district in which the plaintiff resides under 28
U.S.C. 1391 (e) (3). But as noncitizens of the United States, most prospective plaintiffs held
in detention facilities overseas would lack a U.S. residence on which to base such a venue
claim. As for U.S. citizens with established residences, the statute would provide a venue
option at the plaintiffs residence in keeping with the liberal venue rules that govern litigation against the federal government.
204

See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).

205
206
207

411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973).
512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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then the territorial limits on the habeas power 208
in § 2241 might appear
to foreclose reliance on alternative remedies.
The next two sections address these arguments against the equitable alternative to habeas relief. The sections show that territorial limits arose to restrict the use of habeas corpus as a form of judicial
process to compel in-court production of the prisoner. Such limits
need not apply to habeas substitutes, such as actions for injunctive
and declaratory relief. Similarly, the notion of habeas exclusivity
arose to prevent petitioners from side-stepping the special rules that
apply to collateral review of the constitutionality of state court convictions. Such exclusivity does not govern challenges to executive detention, where alternative remedies, including declaratory relief, have
long been seen as appropriate substitutes for habeas litigation.
1.

The Inapplicability of TerritorialLimits

History supports a personal jurisdictional characterization of the
habeas statute's territorial limits. The precursor to § 2241 entered the
statute books during Reconstruction, as the Republicans expanded
habeas to provide a judicial remedy for those detained under color of
both state and federal authority. 20 9 During debates on the bill, Senator Johnson questioned the territorial ambit of the contemplated
habeas power. 21 0 Under the unqualified terms of the statute, he
feared that district courts might claim the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus on behalf of persons "imprisoned in any part of the
United States." 2 11 Senator Johnson fretted that district courts in the
District of Columbia might, for example, issue the writ on behalf of a
person imprisoned in the district of Florida.2 12 Questions understand-

208
In a contemporary of the Rasul litigation, the D.C. Circuit Court adopted a similar
conception of habeas exclusivity in refusing to permit the Al Odah petitioners to disclaim
reliance on habeas corpus in their challenge to detention at Guantanamo Bay. See Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144-45 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004). This Article contends below that exclusivity arguments drawn from
cases brought by prisoners held under state or analogous law do not apply to cases involving executive detention.
209
See Fairman, supra note 129, at 634-40.
210
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867).
211
Id.
212
See id. Professor Fairman reports that SenatorJohnson had represented Dr. Mudd,
the physician who provided medical treatment to John Wilkes Booth after Booth assassinated Abraham Lincoln. See Fairman, supra note 129, at 636-38. Dr. Mudd was charged
before a military commission with complicity in the crime and was held pending trial in the
District of Florida. Id. Fairman believes thatJohnson's efforts as counsel to procure a writ
of habeas corpus to test Mudd's trial by commission made him a particularly knowledgeable critic of habeas authority. See id.
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ably arose about the potential expense and inconvenience of such an
2 13
unlimited habeas authority.
A brief sketch of habeas practice helps to explain the nature of
these problems. At the time Senator Johnson raised his concern,
habeas proceedings began with the submission of a motion or petition
for the writ supported by affidavits or sworn statements. 2 14 If the
showing of cause was sufficient, the judge would issue the writ of
habeas corpus, directing the respondent to bring the petitioner into
court, along with the reasons for confinement, for a judicial disposition of the claim of unlawful imprisonment.2 1 5 The requirement of
the petitioner's in-court production explains the emphasis on geographic convenience; one supporter of the bill, Senator Trumbull, acknowledged that it would "hardly be tolerated that the district judge
in California should issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring before him
some person from Maryland." 2 16 Other aspects of habeas practice, including the asymmetric rules of finality2 17 and the rules of successive
213
The Court's own historical accounts of the adoption of the territorial restriction
parallel the one in the text. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).
214
See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385.
215
In the Act of February 5, 1867, Congress provided for the custodian to return the
writ together with the petitioner and the cause of confinement within three to ten days,
depending on the distance between the place of confinement and the courthouse. See id.,
14 Stat. at 386. Federal courts enforced obedience to writs of habeas corpus (and other
prerogative writs) through the issuance of a body attachment that would authorize the
marshal to arrest the jailer. See id.
216
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867). Adoption of the statute would
not necessarily have produced the problems that Senator Johnson highlighted. The district courts had long taken the position that their power to issue process, in habeas proceedings and otherwise, extended only within the territorial boundaries of their districts.
See Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5657) (holding that lower
federal courts may not issue their process into another district); In re Bickley, 3 Fed. Cas.
332 (S.D.N.Y 1865) (No. 1387) (finding that that the district court in New York lacks power
to issue a writ of habeas corpus in relation to an imprisonment in Massachusetts). By
reading such territorial limits into the new habeas statute, district courts would avoid the
inconvenience noted by the advocates of the more restrictive language.
217
At common law, petitioners who won release achieved a decisive victory, but respondents that successfully defended detention might face a number of successive petitions before another court orjudge of competentjurisdiction. See SHARPE, supra note 178,
at 201-02. The decisiveness of a petitioner's victory flowed from the absence of any provision for appellate review; habeas arose as a summary process, was tried on affidavits, and
was determined without a jury. See id. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, no provision was
made for an appeal from a habeas disposition (just as there was no provision for an appeal
from an acquittal of an individual at trial). See ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The Act of February 5,
1867 included a provision for appellate review of lower federal courts by the Supreme
Court. Ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. at 386. No doubt the provision reflected the government's
concern that some lower courts might be too quick to grant the writ in challenges to military reconstruction. Congress's decision to repeal this provision, upheld in Ex parteMcCard/e, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-14 (1869), left the Court free to review a lower court
decision through the submission of a successive "original" petition as in Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 99-101 (1807). See Pfander, supra note 131, at 1478-79.
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petitioning, 21 8 would have exacerbated the threat posed by a territorially unrestricted habeas power. Although sponsors of the bill doubted
that the courts would adopt such a reading of the legislation, they
nonetheless agreed to limit the district courts' power to issue the writ
"within their respective jurisdictions.

'2 19

The evident purpose of

these limits was to ensure that habeas litigation went forward in the
most convenient forum, where the district court enjoyed personal jurisdiction over the immediate custodian and only a short distance sep2 20
arated the place of confinement from the courthouse.
The procedural rules that drove the territorial restrictions of the
nineteenth century no longer invariably apply to litigation over the
legality of detention. In 1941, the Supreme Court abandoned the
practice of requiring in-court production of petitioners and approved
the litigation of habeas issues through the issuance of an order to
show cause, followed by the submission of briefs and affidavits. 22 1 The
habeas statute codifies this practice, permitting a district court to issue
an order to show cause rather than the writ itself as the prelude to an
inquiry into detention. 222 "Habeas corpus" petitioners no longer routinely appear in court2 23 and no longer invariably seek release from

custody as the remedy. 224 The rules of finality have changed as well;
petitioners must make a substantial showing to justify the submission
of second or successive petitions. 2 25 Finally, federal law provides for
appellate review of habeas decisions regardless of whether the deci2 26
sion favors the government or the petitioner.
218
On the inapplicability of claim and issue preclusion, see SHARPE, supra note 178, at
202-03. In the well-known case of Ex parte Bollman, the petitioners first sought relief from
the circuit court for the District of Columbia. 8 U.S. at 76 n.2. Lacking any statutory basis
for an appeal from the circuit court's denial of relief, petitioners simply filed in the Supreme Court, and eventually gained their release from custody. See id. at 101. Indeed, the
petitioners attended the proceeding and were freed by the Court's decision. See id. at 125,
136. Justice Johnson's dissent in Bollman focuses in part on the Court's conclusion that it
enjoyed habeas jurisdiction that overlapped with that of the lower court. See id. at 104
(Johnson,J., dissenting). For a general discussion of Boliman, see Pfander, supra note 131,
at 1478-87.
219
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 790 (1867).
220
See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
221
See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 284 (1941).
222
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
223
The district courts have not ordered the production of the petitioner in court in
any of the recent challenges to detention of enemy combatants. Of course, the petitioner
may at some point appear in court to testify in a proceeding.
224
In addition to release from custody, habeas litigants may challenge the collateral
consequences of a wrongful conviction, including the possibility of future incarceration.
See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973).
225
In cases involving the use of habeas to challenge a criminal conviction, rules of
finality generally limit successive petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. In cases involving a challenge to executive detention, similar judge-made rules have arisen as a bar to successive
petitions. See Amerson v. INS, 36 F. Supp. 2d. 339, 344 (D. La. 1998).
226
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).
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With the abandonment of key features of habeas practice, including the tradition of in-court production of the prisoner, detention litigation today more closely resembles a suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief than the traditional petition for habeas corpus. In
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, for example, the Supreme Court
permitted a habeas petitioner who was incarcerated in Alabama on a
state criminal conviction to challenge the timeliness of a prospective
criminal proceeding in Kentucky. 22 7 In two related innovations, Braden permitted an action for relief other than immediate release from
custody to proceed in a district other than that of the immediate custodian. 228 In doing so, the decision treated the territorial restrictions
of § 2241 less as an inflexible jurisdictional barrier than as a venue
provision that served to allocate the litigation to the district court with
the most immediate connection to the Kentucky criminal proceeding.
While Padilla reaffirms the territorial model for custody in the
United States (and the accompanying district-of-confinement and immediate-custodian rules),229 the habeas statute itself provides the basis
for rejecting that model in overseas cases. If we interpret § 2241 as
denying district courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus in
relation to detention overseas, then overseas detainees may be able to
seek alternative forms of relief. The territorial limits of the statute
might thus serve to confine the rigidity of Padilla to domestic cases,
leaving overseas litigation to develop in accordance with the more
230
flexible tradition of nonstatutory review.
2.

The Inapplicability of Habeas Exclusivity

Reliance upon a nonstatutory action for injunctive and declaratory relief in overseas cases to which habeas corpus does not extend
may appear to run counter to the tradition of habeas exclusivity in the
United States. 23 1 But that tradition of exclusivity arose in connection
with the Court's desire to preserve the limits it placed on the ability of
state prisoners to mount collateral attacks in federal court on state
criminal convictions. Familiar limits include the barrier to cognizance
of alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment; 232 the exhaustion
doctrine, restricting access to federal court until the petitioner has
227 Braden, 410 U.S. at 500-01.
228 See id.
229 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446-51 (2004).
230 For a discussion of the changing nature of habeas litigation, and its impact on the
continued vitality of the immediate-custodian rule in the immigration context, see Armentero v. INS, 412 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting).
231
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
232 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976).
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first sought relief in state court; 23 3 and the rules barring relief except
in cases in which the state courts failed to correctly apply an established rule of constitutional law. 2 34 Exclusivity functions to protect

the values of federalism and finality that underlie the development of
23 5
these limits on habeas authority.
In litigation over executive detention overseas, the federalism
and finality values that drive exclusivity do not apply. 23 6 In overseas

cases, the petitioners challenge not a criminal conviction (whether in
state or federal court), but detention based upon the decision of an
executive government official. Such a focus on executive detention
lies at the heart of the writ's historic function, but within that core, no
rules of exclusivity have developed. The common law treated a variety
of remedial forms as substitutes for habeas corpus.2 3 7 Blackstone acknowledged the importance of habeas corpus as the preferred rem23 8
edy, but identified four other remedies for wrongful confinement.
Three operated like habeas in affording specific relief from custody;
the fourth, the action in trespass for false imprisonment, provided
compensation or satisfaction for wrongful confinement. 239 More recent scholarship confirms the availability of an array of remedies for
illegal custody. 240 The prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition were sometimes used to secure the petitioner's release
2313 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (2000); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45
(1999); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
234 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1); cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989) (barring
habeas relief in state prisoner cases except as to state court errors in applying established
principles of federal law).
235 Thus, in the Court's most recent decision in this area, it found that the doctrine of
habeas exclusivity did not bar a § 1983 claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for a
violation of federal law that habeas could not remedy. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S
- 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1244-45 (2005). The appellant in Wilkinson sought to challenge the state procedures for considering an application for parole. Id. at 1244. The
appellant, if successful, would have received a new parole proceeding, but the fact and
duration of confinement would not have changed. See id. at 1248. By concluding that
habeas relief did not apply, the Court found no basis for preempting the § 1983 action for
injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. at 1249.
236
Of course, the exhaustion requirement may apply in executive detention cases as in
immigration cases in which applicants for release from custody under immigration laws
must first exhaust available remedies before filing a habeas petition. See Duvall v. Elwood,
336 F.3d 228, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2000).
237
See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *128.
238
Blackstone identified the interest in personal liberty as an absolute right of individuals, and divided the array of available remedies into those designed to obtain release from
custody and those designed to obtain damages for wrongful confinement. Id. As for release, Blackstone identified three outmoded writs and a fourth, habeas corpus, that issued
to compel release from custody. Id at *128-38. As for damages, Blackstone pointed to the
all-purpose trespass action, which encompassed claims for false imprisonment, assault, and
battery. Id. at *138.
239

1d&

240

See SHARPE, supra note 178, at 60.
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from unlawful custody. 24 1 In addition, the declaratory judgment action substitutes for habeas corpus by providing an alternative mode of
24 2
challenging the legality of custody.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
alternative forms of relief may substitute for habeas corpus. In United
States v. Hayman, the Court ruled that Congress could substitute review by motion under § 2255 for review by petition for writ of habeas
corpus under § 2241 as the primary method for collateral judicial review of federal criminal convictions. 243 The crucial issue, as the Court
recognized, was to allow Congress the flexibility to substitute a more
convenient mode of review while preserving the fundamental features
of habeas oversight. 244 Moreover, in a series of cases involving claims
that the availability of habeas impliedly displaced other remedies such
as suits seeking nonstatutory review, the Court has declined to treat
245
habeas remedies as preclusive.
Questions of implied preclusion have arisen most commonly in
immigration litigation, in which habeas corpus provides the traditional remedy for individuals seeking to challenge deportation and
exclusion orders. 246 In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, which began as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge deportation, the
government argued that the habeas remedy impliedly precluded any
reliance on other forms of relief, such as nonstatutory review. 24 7 The
Court rejected the argument, emphasizing that the APA, when interpreted in connection with a new immigration statute, created a presumption in favor of nonstatutory review that could stand alongside
the habeas remedy. 248 In subsequent decisions, the Court made nonstatutory review available as an alternative to habeas in exclusion cases
as well. 249 While it has acknowledged that Congress retains control

over the availability of review and may restrict it in appropriate situations, 250 the Court clearly recognized that nonstatutory review might
Id.
Id. at 60-61.
243
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952).
244
See id. at 219-21.
245
See infra text accompanying notes 261-64.
246
On the significance of the habeas remedy in the immigration context, see INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-01 (2001).
247
349 U.S. 48, 52 (1955).
248
Id. at 51.
249
See Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184 (1956).
250
Following Pedreiroand We Shung, Congress modified the process for reviewing immigration proceedings. For an account of the legislative changes, see Gerald L. Neuman,
Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998).
On the Court's use of the Suspension Clause to resist overbroad congressional efforts to
exclude review, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289.
241

242
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coexist with habeas as an alternative remedy, even for aliens in
25 1
custody.
If available habeas remedies do not ordinarily displace nonstatutory review, then it makes no sense to argue that implied habeas preclusion eliminates recourse to other avenues for challenging overseas
detention. 25 2 Nonstatutory review has always played the role of a gap
filler, securing an adequate mode of judicial review in cases in which
the statutory provisions for such review fall short. In the case of overseas detention, the habeas statute creates a gap by declining to authorize issuance except within U.S. territory. 2 53 As previously discussed,
the apparent purpose of the territorial restriction was to ensure
proper venue and personal jurisdiction, and not to foreclose judicial
review in overseas cases. 254 Indeed, the Supreme Court's repeated
recognition of overseas petitioners' right to test the legality of their
detentions notwithstanding the habeas statute clearly reflects the
Court's conclusion that the statute has little force as an implied restriction of overseas cases. By recognizing the availability of nonstatutory review, the Court could place its overseas exception on a sound
foundation.
Of course, reliance upon nonstatutory review through an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief might restrict the full range of
remedial options familiar to habeas litigation. But the remedial authority of the district courts would not likely diminish in any significant way. To be sure, district courts would dispense with required incourt production of the petitioner, but such production has long
since disappeared from habeas practice. 25 5 Moreover, the Court has
made clear that the All Writs Act 256 provides the district courts with

authority, even in proceedings that substitute for habeas corpus, to
order the production of a detained plaintiff in appropriate circumstances. 25 7 It thus seems clear that the district courts would retain the
power to order the plaintiffs production either to secure testimony
about the conditions of confinement or to enforce a release order.
District courts might also stretch precedents slightly to secure the
See We Shung, 352 U.S. at 186.
Lower federal courts have occasionally treated habeas as the exclusive remedy for
certain kinds of challenges to custody and have barred other forms of relief. See, e.g., LoBue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1996). However much weight such decisions carry in light of conflicting Supreme Court authority, they clearly have little
persuasive force in an overseas context in which the relevant statute forecloses habeas relief altogether.
253 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).
254
See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
255
See supra note 223.
256
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
257
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1952).
251
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right of third parties to file nonstatutory review complaints as the next
258
friends of those imprisoned.
C.

The Loss of the Suspension Clause

Perhaps more troubling to some, the switch from habeas (with an
overseas "exception") to nonstatutory review might expose the availability of review to the risk of congressional or presidential suspension.
The Court has indicated in recent years that the Suspension Clause
may impose important limits on the ability of Congress to curtail judicial review. The Court has used its desire to avoid such constitutional
questions to justify a fairly aggressive approach to the interpretation of
statutes that purport to restrict review. Thus, in INS v. St. Cyr, the
Court found that a statute avowedly seeking to restrict habeas review
in the immigration field might present a constitutional question
under the Suspension Clause and interpreted the statute to dodge the
question that such curtailment presented. 259 Supporters of broad review may fear that the Court will prove less protective of nonstatutory
review than of review couched in terms of the "great writ" of habeas
260
corpus.
In considering this argument, one should first recognize that the
Court may use other constitutional provisions and principles to resist
curtailing judicial review. In Webster v. Doe, the Court refused to construe a statute granting discretion to the director of the CIA as precluding judicial review of constitutional claims, based partly on doubts
derived from the Due Process Clause. 26 1 In Felker v. Turpin, the Court
emphasized its own appellate jurisdiction as a potential source of
doubts about the scope of congressional power. 26 2 In Crowell v. Benson, the Court creatively reinterpreted a federal statute to preserve a
litigant's right to invoke the judicial power of the United States in an
Article III court for review of an agency's determination of certain
kinds of legal claims. 26 3 With this array of alternative bases for resisting curtailment of review, some scholars believe that the SuspenSee Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 n.4 (1990).
533 U.S. 289 (2001). For an account, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus
Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555 (2002).
260 The Court has provided little guidance as to the protections afforded by the Suspension Clause, even in wholly domestic cases. The Court has indicated that the Suspension Clause at a minimum protects the writ as it existed in 1789, and thus encompasses
review of errors of law and challenges to the jurisdiction of the custodian. See St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 302. But it has used this historic conception of the writ as the basis for demanding a
clear statement rather than as a basis for invalidating federal laws. See id. at 299-300. How
well the constitutional interpretation on which the St. Cyr Court based its clear statement
requirement will hold up in post-September 11 litigation remains an open question.
261
See 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
262
See 518 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1996).
263
See 285 U.S. 22, 89 (1932).
258
259
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sion Clause adds little to the constitutional limits on congressional
264
power.
One should also recognize that these suspension arguments
would remain available even if the nonstatutory conception of overseas detention litigation prevailed. If Congress declined to make
habeas available and substituted instead a more restricted form of
nonstatutory review under § 1331, litigants may challenge the resulting remedial options as a prohibited curtailment of their right to the
writ. The English common law history recounted in Part I may reinforce such an argument, but the historical failure of the American
habeas statute to make an explicit provision for the issuance of the
writ to overseas custodians may detract somewhat from its force. Importantly, though, the Court has made it clear that arguments based
on the Suspension Clause remain viable in the wake of a congressional shift from traditional habeas proceedings to more modern
forms of detention litigation. 2 65 In the end, the substance matters
more than the form of the remedy in determining whether any particular adaptation presents a Suspension Clause problem.
CONCLUSION

The scope of judicial review of government action in the global
war on terror may well turn on how we characterize the work of the
nation's justice, security, and defense apparatus. When the Department of Defense conducts a shooting war, judicial deference seems
both appropriate and overwhelmingly likely. Indeed, one can attribute the deference of the lower federal courts in the early rounds of
the Rasul litigation to this tradition of judicial deference to the government during times of war. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the hostilities in Afghanistan had ended and
the Court faced the prospect that those captured might be detained
into the indefinite future. 26 6 Similarly, the district court's decision to
264
Cf. Daniel Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537
(1998) (emphasizing Article III as an important constitutional limit on Congress's power
to curtail judicial review). Compare Neuman, supra note 250 (arguing that the Suspension
Clause acts as a restriction on Congress's power to curtail judicial review of immigration
orders), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1998) (arguing that due process provides the relevant limits on
congressional power).
265
See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380-82 (1977) (entertaining, but rejecting on
the merits, a claim that Congress violated the Suspension Clause by ending routine habeas
review in the federal district courts and switching to review before Article I tribunals);
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (entertaining, but rejecting on the
merits, a claim that Congress violated the Suspension Clause by restricting habeas review
and substituting a § 2255 motion by federal prisoners who wish to challenge their federal
convictions).
266
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).

2006]

THE LIMITS OF HABEAS JURISDICTION

order Mr. Padilla's release was no doubt due in part to the court's
perception that the circumstances surrounding his apprehension in
Chicago more nearly resembled the arrest of an accused criminal than
the capture of an enemy soldier.2 6 7 The Fourth Circuit rejected the
district court's approach based largely on its finding that Mr. Padilla
had been determined to have fought against U.S. forces in Afghani26 8
stan, and was properly characterized as an enemy combatant.
The APA helps to confirm the propriety of judicial review in military cases overseas. The Act's definition of an agency includes the
Defense Department, and it establishes a presumption of judicial review in many cases. To be sure, the Act does not purport to regulate
review in two situations: 269 the judgments of courts martial and military commissions and the exercise of military authority in the field of
war or in occupied territory. But the failure to regulate in these two
exceptional cases invites the courts to consider other sources of relevant law and generally confirms thatjudicial oversight extends to overseas conduct of the military (at least when the field-of-war and
occupation exceptions do not apply). When the exceptions do not
apply, the APA's presumption in favor of judicial review applies with
its customary vigor and helps to confirm the availability of nonstatutory review of overseas military detention.
This confirmation that federal law provides the measure of the
legality of U.S. military actions overseas draws on several centuries of
Anglo-American law. English law followed the English army into battle and the superior courts at Westminster stood ready to apply the
common law to test the boundaries of military authority throughout
the empire. Just as Lord Mansfield rejected the notion that military
authority in Minorca and Gibraltar created lawless enclaves, last
Term's decision in Rasul rejected the creation of a lawless enclave in
Guantanamo Bay.
Rasuls rejection of the immediate-custodian model of habeas jurisdiction provides the foundation for a more capacious model of
nonstatutory review in which overseas detention gives rise to an action
for injunctive and declaratory relief. Such an approach would clarify
the power of the courts to proceed against high government officials
in Washington, D.C., the very officials whose policy decisions the litigation seeks to contest. Moreover, the nonstatutory review model
would invite federal courts to recognize that U.S. law follows the U.S.
military into bases and detention centers around the world. Just as
the members of the armed forces must follow the military code and
267 See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (D.S.C.), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir.
2005), petitionfor cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct. 25, 2005) (No. 05-533).
268 See Padilla, 423 F.3d at 397.
269
See supra note 12.
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the orders of the President, so too must they respect any decisions in
which the federal courts conclude that the executive branch has exceeded legal boundaries. The ultimate question, as Justice Jackson
explained in Johnson v. Eisentrager,is not the scope of habeas jurisdiction overseas, but the jurisdiction of the civil courts in relation to military authorities. 2 70 While the civil courts may choose to defer, they
doubtless have the power to overturn unlawful military detention.

270

See supra note 156 and accompanying text.

